General Tactics.

[Longmane]

With the subject of flanking tactics having been raised as a subject on the forum, I thought I'd begin posting a few pieces on tactics in general out of Verbruggens excellent "The Art of Warfare In Western Europe During in the Middle Ages".

I apologize in advance if this particular thread not only takes me a while to finish, but also if some of the sub sections pieces are overly long.



Battle Order pt 1
The battle of Hab, in 1119, gives an interesting example of battle order, fully described by a contemporary writer.

King Baldwin II of Jerusalem formed his armies as follows: the front line consisted of three detachments, each made up of a body of knights and a body of foot-soldiers, for mutual protection.

In the second line was the count of Tripoli with his vassals, but these troops were drawn up further to the right than the first line, thus broadening the front.  Robert Fulcoy, lord of Zerdana, was on the extreme left, with the knights from Antioch in several smaller formations. These formations also made up part of the second line, and extended the front leftwards.  In the third line came King Baldwin, with three detachments, which were drawn up behind the front line units.

                                                                        ...... ......    ...... ......   ...... ......   (knights)

                                                                   === ===    === ===    === ===    (foot)


                                                       .... ....                                                               .... ....

                                            (Robert  Fulcoy)                                                  (Pons of  Tripoli)


                                                                      ..........       .............      ...........

                                                                                    (Baldwin II)


Thus the troops of Robert Fulcoy and Pons of Tripoli were able to perform a double task, first to broaden the front and to attack the enemy frontally or in the flank, and secondly to protect the flank of their own army.  Baldwin's battle order was just such as Leo the Wise of Byzantium had praised centuries earlier in his Taktika.  As in the advance of Ascalon, Delbrück would like to suppose that these troops were marching in narrow columns, which were first deployed at the start of the battle. But the source says nothing about this, and we have already shown that there is no advantage in it if the enemy's position is known and fighting can start at once.

[Longmane]

Battle Order pt 2

Attacks were also sometimes made by echelons rather similarly disposed. The first line charges first, then those formations move which are to the right and left of the front line, but form a second line. These units can react to the enemy's manoeuvrings, and either protect the two flanks of the front lines, or else attack at each end of it in order to relieve their own men or outflank the enemy. Thus in attacking with formations in echelon the battle is enlarged along the flanks. They can either check the enemy's encircling tactics, or else outflank him in his turn, instead of supporting the rear of the formation in front.

The crusaders used these tactics several times so that they could fight on a broader front than if the formations of the second and third line were placed immediately behind the first.  At the same time, they enjoyed the advantage of having a deep formation, with three lines of troops.  Sarmin (14 September 1115),  Athareb (28 June 1119) and the battle of Hab discussed above are all good examples of this.

From the chronicle of Henry of Valenciennes we gather that the troops of the emperor Henry I of Constantinople used this sort of battle-order in the battle of Philippopoli.  'Piers de Braiesceul and N. de Mailli were in the advance guard with Geoffrey the Marshal, and they said they would push ahead between him and Milon le Braibant with Guillaume dou Parçoi and Lyenars de Hyelemes behind them, and the emperor would guard the attackers.

This gives us the following battle order, in which we have made the necessary allowance for the arrangement right and left of the forces listed.  Villehardouin (Geoffrey the Marshal) might of course have been on the left and Milon le Braibant on the right, and this applies to the other formations too.


                                                                                              ..............        ..............

                                                                                              (P. de. Br)           (Mailli)

                                                                           ..........                                                    ..........
                                   
                                                                           (Milon)                                             (Villehardouin)

                                                           ..........                                                                                        ..........

                                                        (Guillaume)                                                                                   (Lienard)





Of course, it is possible that the formations of Villehardouin and Milon le Braibant were originally as far forward as those of Piers de Braiescuel and Nicoles de Mailli. But, in any case, these two units of the advance guard moved off before Milon and Villehardouin charged.  During the attack, the position was as shown, and it is a pity that we do not know the positions of the three units of Greek troops who took part in the battle.

[Longmane]

Co-operation of Cavalry and Foot-soldiers in Battle

Where knights and foot-soldiers appeared together in any co-ordinated battle-order the knights were usually the main force and the foot-soldiers the supporting troops. This was the result of the hegemony of armoured cavalry.  Already in the time of Vegetius the foot-soldiers were playing a passive part. The heavily armed legionaries had to stand still in close formation while the lightly armed troops started the fighting. If the latter were successful, they pursued the enemy, but if they failed they retreated behind the heavier troops as behind an iron wall. Then, if the enemy were beaten off, the light foot and cavalry took up the chase together, but the heavy foot-soldiers stayed put, for fear of their ranks being broken up by a renewed enemy attack.  According to Vegetius, a legion of his time could neither easily pursue nor flee themselves.

Vegetius then thought of putting the cavalry on the flanks of the legion. The author of the Strategikon claims that the footsoldiers had been neglected for a long time, or even no longer existed.  He drew up a new code for their use. In order to secure co-operation between the two branches he proposed an initial attack by foot-soldiers followed up by cavalry, who were then to move up through the ranks of the foot-soldiers in order to charge. In case of failure, the cavalry were to take up their position behind the foot-soldiers.

Emperor Leo VI 'the Wise' gave the following case in his Taktika. If the enemy had a strong army of knights and the Byzantines only a weak force of foot, the foot-soldiers were to be stationed one or two bow-shots behind the Byzantine cavalry, so that the latter could withdraw behind them if a charge failed.  But their retreat was to be along the footsoldiers' flanks, not through their ranks.

The foot-soldier's passive role is very old.  According to whether it had kept a satisfactory standard, or had improved or increased with time, it could support knights in battle in different ways. A differentiation should be made between those armies in which the knights remained the more important section and the foot played the humble role of supporting troops, and those countries where the foot had early reached some degree of excellence and were helped by the knights.


Independent Action of Foot-soldiers in Co-operation with Cavalry

While duke John I of Brabant was making a frontal attack with his allies at Worringen in 1288, the peasants from the county of Berg and the communal army from Cologne marched towards the flank of the army of the princebishop of Cologne and attacked it. Their action against this flank and the enemy's rear decided the outcome. But we do not know whether the initiative for this came from the count of Berg or from the tactical leader of the battle, the count of Virneburg.

Foot-soldiers in the army of the Scottish kings naturally provided various examples of independent action, since they had only a few knights, in comparison with English kings. The co-operation of these two branches depended chiefly on the strength of the foot. The knights protected the flanks or were used as a reserve. The foot-soldiers played the chief part and the mounted knights acted as supporting troops.

In the armies of the English kings, the archers also had independent tasks against the enemy's flanks, and in these armies the foot-soldiers became more important. In the middle of the fourteenth century, however, Edward III succeeded in also raising large armies of knights, so that there was a balance between foot-soldiers and cavalry. A genuine interacting tactical system was evolved between the two branches in which the archers were the more effective force. But this joint action was only possible if these archers could rely on the support of knights fighting on foot, and on a mounted reserve.

The battle of Hausbergen is an interesting case in which foot-soldiers fought successfully on their own. In 1262 the bishop of Strasbourg, Walter of Geroldseck, had an argument with the commune of the city. He collected an army consisting of 300 knights and a good body of foot-soldiers. But before the foot-soldiers arrived, he advanced on the communal army of Strasbourg and their allies. The Strasbourgers were led by two knights, the lords of Ohsenstein and Hohenstein, who had also brought their armoured cavalry with them. The citizens had sworn to obey all their orders implicitly.

Both commanders decided to join battle with the bishop's mounted army before his foot-soldiers arrived. They therefore placed 300 crossbowmen on the road which the bishop's foot-soldiers would have to use, in order to prevent them, if possible, from taking part in the fighting. Half of these crossbowmen were to shoot as continuously as possible, while the other half loaded for their companions. Thus they could reckon on an effective rain of arrows.

While the bishop's foot-soldiers were thus kept out of the battle and a good deal of time was wasted, both commanders, with their knights, began the battle with the bishop's cavalry. The communal army from Strasbourg had to join in the mêlée. While the battle was raging, the Strasbourg soldiers came up quickly and outflanked the bishop's mounted knights. With their pikes they stabbed and cut down the horses of the Alsatian knights, so that the knights were dragged down with their horses. Thus the communal army on foot supported the attack of their allies and thanks to superiority of numbers, they won the battle.

[Longmane]

Foot-soldiers as Supporting Troops for Cavalry

We have seen that the Emperor Leo VI of Byzantium posted foot-soldiers as supporting troops behind his armored cavalry in certain cases. We meet the same use of foot-soldiers elsewhere. Armed foot-soldiers were stationed to right and left, and single cavalrymen were posted among them so that they should hold their positions. The foot-soldiers had to let in the armored cavalry, should some of them be driven back. Part of the foot played a similar role while the rest were striking camp at the battle of Doryleum, during the first crusade. This served to check the flight of the cavalry: or gave them the chance to re-form their ranks, while the close-packed foot kept the enemy at a distance.

A strong body of foot-soldiers placed behind the formations of knights could be a great help while the latter were regrouping after a charge. Under the protection of the pikes or lances of the foot, the knights could get their breath again after their exhausting charges. In some cases, small companies of knights even took refuge in the circle of foot-soldiers, as Renaud de Dammartin did at Bouvines.

In general, the foot played a passive part until the cavalry had started fighting. That was the moment for the foot to move up to help the knights. There are many examples of this.

At Steppes, Thierry de Walcourt told the civic levies of the Meuse towns to stay in close formation, with pikes and lances stuck into the ground. These foot-soldiers had to turn back their own knights, if these tried to flee through their own ranks. As in the treatise of Leo VI, the knights had thus to withdraw along the flanks of the foot-soldiers in case of need, in order to regroup. The civic levies from Liége, Huy, Dinant and Fosses, however, moved up behind their knights as soon as the latter had attacked the enemy. They killed those of their opponents who had been unhorsed, or took them prisoner, and followed the knights during the pursuit.

Mutual Support of Knights and Foot-soldiers

The mutual support of formations of knights and foot can best be seen in the First Crusade and in the subsequent war fought by the armies of the Kingdom of Jerusalem against the Moslems. In the early stage of the battle the foot-soldiers advanced in front of the knights, protecting them frontally, their own rear being covered by the cavalry. These archers shot at the enemy cavalry and tried to keep them at a distance. At the vital moment the knights rode past them, followed by the footsoldiers.

While the knights bore the brunt of the frontal attack, the foot in turn protected their rear. The Turkish archers naturally outflanked the Christian archers and often preferred to attack the foot in the hope of putting them out of action at once, then being able to attack the knights from the rear. When this happened, the cavalry had no supporting troops behind which they could withdraw between charges, if their first attack should fail, or if they were exhausted.

As soon as the knights had made their highly mobile enemy join battle, then had ridden down the enemy formations by their tremendous charges, the foot could rush up. Any Turks who had been unhorsed were killed or captured and bound by the footsoldiers, who also helped the fallen knights of their own side to remount, and carried off wounded knights. If the foot got the chance, they also took part in close-range fighting, and attacked the horses of the Turks and Arabs.

The foot eased the task of the cavalry also by taking on a part of the enemy forces which might otherwise have been fighting against the cavalry. The knights realized that the foot-soldiers were necessary to increase the strength of their forces and put out of action any of the enemy who were unhorsed. The foot-soldiers were also useful in protecting their flanks. The knights then had to take care not to leave them too far behind, so as to be able to hurry to their help in good time if need arose.

Already by 1102 a defeat of the knights of king Baldwin I of Jerusalem was attributed, among other things, to the fact that they had fought without foot-soldiers. In the crusaders' great march to Arsuf under Richard I in 1191, the knights protected the main body of the foot while the crossbowmen of the rearguard protected the knights in their turn. Once the battle of Arsuf had begun, the footsoldiers quickly finished off the unhorsed enemy before the knights had to come back to regroup after the charge.

These tactics were also applied in western Europe, but the knights had less reason to fear an attack from the rear than they did in the Middle East. Indeed, the great armies of knights had large enough forces to fight their own battles in most cases. It was not always so necessary to use foot-soldiers and there were many battles in which knights alone were involved.

In the West, army leaders tried to make their foot-soldiers more effective on several occasions by stiffening their ranks with knights fighting on foot. Robert Guiscard did this, and at Tinchebray in 1106, King Henry I dismounted with his retinue and took up a position in the middle of the foot, who did not actually have to fight in this battle. His opponent, Robert of Normandy, did the same and also stayed in the middle of his foot-soldiers. These soldiers were beaten after the knights had defeated. 

At Brémule Henry I ordered knights to dismount and fight on foot, while another party of knights made up the mounted reserve. He defeated king Louis VI who attacked with insufficiently ordered formations of knights. At Bourg-Théroulde Norman knights increased the effectiveness of their archers against rebellious noblemen, by dismounting and fighting on foot with the foot-soldiers, and at Northallerton in 1138 the Anglo-Norman riders dismounted and took up positions among the foot.

[Longmane]

Preparation for Battle by Archers

Just as the heavy foot could be used to prepare for cavalry charges, and protect the rear of the knights' ranks, follow in the mêlée and deal with those of the enemy who were unhorsed, so crossbowmen and ordinary archers could play a most useful part in co-operating with the other branches of the army.

One of the oldest and most famous examples of archers preparing for a cavalry battle is found in William the Conqueror's great victory at Hastings. His archers advanced first of all against the dense English formation. They were followed by heavy foot-soldiers. But when they were within reach of the enemy on the hill, they were met by a rain of missiles, arrows, lances, small axes and stones tied to heavy sticks. They were driven back, but were able to avenge themselves later in the day. Then the archers advanced between two cavalry charges. While the armoured cavalry were re-forming after the charge, the archers harassed the solid blocks of English foot-soldiers. This caused heavy losses among Harold's soldiers. The king himself was hit in the eye by an arrow. In the splendid representation in the Bayeux tapestry the great shields of the English are stuck full of arrows. There is no doubt that William's archers made a very useful contribution in this battle.

In the First Crusade the western knights met with mounted archers, a form of fighting hitherto unknown to them. They protected their formations with foot-soldiers, especially crossbowmen, who had to keep the enemy cavalry at a distance, and so to protect the knights' horses from the enemy arrows. While the Turkish horsemen were trying to put the crusaders' archers out of action, the knights were able to come closer and prepare a powerful charge. Once the knights were in the battle, the foot-soldiers withdrew to protect the rear of the armored cavalry. In case of need they could be sent forward again to keep the enemy at a distance. The arrows of the crossbowmen caused severe wounds among the Turks.

During the First Crusade the foot-soldiers put these tactics into practice in the break-out from Antioch and in the battle of Ascalon. In the Third Crusade the crossbowmen played a very important part before the knights started charging at Arsuf. Saladin's biographer speaks very highly of the quality of the foot-soldiers and mentions the devastating effect of their arrows.

The battle of Jaffa in 1192 is another very interesting case in this crusade. Richard I placed footsoldiers armed with spears in the first rank, They knelt down, and held the shafts of their spears embedded in the ground. Their shields were held in the left hand, point downwards and embedded likewise in the ground. Between every two spearmen the king placed a crossbowman, with another man as loader next to each of them. These crossbowmen were Genoese and Pisans, already well known for their skill in handling their weapons. The formation of foot-soldiers made a circle, within which Richard stayed with a very small group of knights. Saladin's warriors advanced towards this formation but soon swerved aside when they saw that the foot-soldiers were drawn up in dense formation. As they rode by the circle, they were greeted with arrows from the crossbowmen. No Moslem troops dared make a charge against this circular formation of Christians. Finally Richard himself counter-attacked, charging through with his little retinue.

We have already seen that Richard had made use of Genoese crossbowmen in Normandy. After his crusade he had some Moslems in his army as well.  In the thirteenth century the Emperor Frederick II had Moslem bowmen in his army but could not use them soon enough at the battle of Cortenuova.  In the battle of Mansurah in the first crusade of St Louis in Egypt, the crossbowmen were only able to take part in the final stages of the battle, but when they were placed in front of the knights and shot off their rain of arrows, the enemy withdrew.

Large numbers of crossbowmen were seldom used before Crécy (1346). When Edward I of England used his longbowmen in large numbers he had a much more efficient weapon for preparation for charges by his knights. This happened at Falkirk with astounding success, after the knights' attack had been beaten off by the Scottish schiltrons. These Welsh and English bowmen became later the best troops in the army of the English king, and we have already noticed in passing what splendid success they had at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. But very often the number of archers in medieval armies was too small, or else they were checked by the enemy's crossbowmen. Army leaders could, of course, use other foot-soldiers, armed with pikes and lances, but these were mostly used for defensive purposes.

[Longmane]

Choice and exploitation of terrain

Choosing the most suitable terrain for a battle was naturally an important matter for a medieval commander. He had to consider the lie of the land and the composition of his army, since a place might be ideal for cavalry but quite unsuitable for foot-soldiers, or vice versa.

Giraldus Cambrensis discussed this very sensibly in describing the differences between tactics in France, Wales and Ireland.

'Although the French cavalry are excellent', he says, 'and well versed in the arts of war, they used methods very different from those employed in Wales or Ireland.  In France they choose fields or flat country, in Wales or Ireland difficult or rugged places and forests.  Fighting is an honorable occupation in France, but here it is a heavy burden: sheer strength triumphs there, but agility here.  Over there they take prisoners, here they are beheaded: there they are ransomed, but here they are killed.  Where military formations are fighting in open country, knights are both protected and decorated by heavy and complicated armour, made of iron and linen.  But if they have to fight in a confined space, or in wooded or marshy country, where foot-soldiers can fight better than cavalry, light armour is much more suitable.  Against these unprotected men (from Ireland) who almost invariably win or lose in the first assault, much lighter weapons suffice.  Where a highly mobile army is fighting in a confined or rugged area, it is only necessary to have a few heavy and medium-weight troops make a flexible attack in order to get the enemy confused. Complicated armour and high curved saddles make it difficult to dismount, and it is even harder to remount. Also, it is much more exhausting to fight on foot if one has to.'


Several centuries earlier, the author of the Strategikon had already noticed this in the Frankish cavalry. Since they were used to charging with their lances in their hands, they needed flat ground, and could not fight so well in a small space or on uneven ground. Of his own army, he wrote that his cavalry was best on flat ground in open country, his foot-soldiers in wooded country.

The crusaders also chose spacious and open country for their battles. Twelve battles which Heermann was able to study took place in flat open country. The Turks also needed this sort of country to let their mounted archers manoeuvre and encircle the Western cavalry.

The crusaders had to solve the important problem of protecting their flanks. In the battle of the Lake of Antioch they chose a confined space in which both flanks were supported by impassable obstacles. During the great sortie from Antioch itself they protected their left flank by placing it against the hills. The deployment of these forces was not yet complete when the Turks outflanked this formation, and a hastily collected force was able to put the enemy to flight.

Baldwin of Boulogne set out for Jerusalem in 1100 to follow in the footsteps of his dead brother, Godfrey of Bouillon, with a little force of 160 knights and 500 foot-soldiers. Originally his army had consisted of 200 knights and 700 foot-soldiers, but when these soldiers heard that the enemy was likely to intercept them, many of them went no further. The coast road from Tripoli to Beirut was constricted at the river Nahr al-Kalb into a narrow pass between the sea and the mountains, where a hundred men were enough to hold the pass against a larger force, by the forces of Duqaq, ruler of Damascus, and his ally the emir of Homs.

An enemy squadron was ready at sea to hinder Baldwin's retreat. When Baldwin's scouts approached the bottleneck, they espied Turkish scouts and realized that a stronger force lay in ambush further on. They sent a message to their commander who at once got his troops into battle-order and ordered the first section to advance. This formation attacked the enemy, but soon found that it was impossible to break through their lines. Baldwin stopped the fight at nightfall, pitching his tents as close as possible to the enemy. 'We pretended to be brave, but were in fear of death. It was hard to stay there, but even worse to retreat: we were besieged on all sides by the enemy. They were threatening us from the sea, and from the hills they were pressing down on us. We had neither food nor rest that day, nor any drink for our beasts. How much rather would I have been in Chartres or Orléans!' says Fulcher, who was there as Baldwin's chaplain.

They spent the night outside their tents, wide awake. In the morning Baldwin decided to lure the enemy from their position in order to attack them in a place where the cavalry would have the advantage. The little army set off with the baggage animals, the knights forming the rearguard to protect the baggage and the foot-soldiers. He withdrew to a small plain, where he hoped to be able to deal with the enemy decisively. His enemies had wanted to attack him first by night but this plan had not worked.

Then they thought of surrounding the Christian army completely by occupying a pass in its rear. They harassed the flanks of the Christians along the sea, and attacked Baldwin's troops from the mountains and the road. Nevertheless, the crusaders managed to reach the little plain. There the knights suddenly faced about, couched their lances and charged in close formation. The shock was so tremendous that the enemy was halted and thrown back to the narrow pass. There was the utmost confusion in the Turkish ranks: some made for the ships, others fled to the mountains, the rest poured through the pass in full retreat. They made no further effort to stop the crusaders.

It was his clever use of terrain which secured this victory. Tancred provides us with a similar example at Tizin on 20 April, 1105. There was a battle between the Norman armies and Ridwan, ruler of Aleppo. Between the two armies lay a rocky plain, on which horses could not move faster than a walking-pace, and even so, many were injured and fell. Tancred knew this and waited on the far side of the plain in order induce the enemy to attack. Ridwan advanced over this difficult country and fell into the trap. Tancred opened the battle with his first formation, which checked the enemy and brought him to a standstill. Then the Norman commander led a counter-attack himself. The enemy withdrew a little in the hope of being able to employ his favorite tactics. But it was too late: the Turks were overtaken and crushed. Their foot-soldiers had already advanced further and had reached the crusaders' camp, but after the flight of the cavalry they were mercilessly cut to pieces by Tancred's men.

There are other examples of this clever exploitation of terrain. At Thielt William Clito made use of a hill to defeat his enemy with a hidden reserve.  At Arsuf, Saladin's armies attacked the crusaders' armies under Richard I in a wide plain which admirably suited his encircling tactics. They advanced out of a great wood, which allowed them to surprise the enemy and which made pursuit exceedingly difficult for their opponents in the case of retreat.

In each of these battles it can be seen how the commanders tried to get an advantage from the nature of the terrain in order to force the enemy into an awkward position. Again, King Philip Augustus of France left Tournai in 1214 to seek a suitable battle-ground where he could better deploy his knightly formations, at Bouvines.

While the knights sought wide open country for fighting, the foot-soldiers naturally chose country in which armoured cavalry could not charge. Giraldus Cambrensis has already been quoted on this subject, describing how the Welsh and Irish fought against this sort of cavalry. At Hastings the English took up a position on a ridge which was very favourable for the foot-soldiers against the cavalry and archers of William the Conqueror; the forest behind their position would facilitate a retreat. Every victory of the footsoldiers in the early fourteenth century was won on ground that was very difficult for knights, such as Courtrai, Bannockburn, Morgarten, and Vottem. At Cortenuova the Lombard foot-soldiers were placed behind a ditch, with their rear protected by the village.

Jean le Bel, who gave such an excellent account of the campaign of 1327, also gives very interesting examples of the use of terrain. The Scots had chosen a position on the slope of a hill behind a brook, at such a distance from the water that the English could get part of their troops across but could not properly manoeuvre on the far side. The rocky nature of the ground was extremely unfavourable to the knights, who dared not risk an attack. Four days later, the Scots chose another position, once more on a hill and behind a river, but better than the first one. Their troops camped in a wood so that they could move off unseen when the command came.

The Welsh selected similar sites. At Orewin Bridge, in 1282, they took up position on a steep hill behind the bank of the river Yrfon, accessible only by a bridge which was blocked by their pikemen, who were nevertheless out of range of arrows from the further bank. In 1295, at Maes Moydog near Conway they stood on the slope of a hill, above the road between two woods into which they could withdraw if an enemy attack were successful. During the conquest of Ireland, at the Dinin in 1168, the knights lured the Irish foot-soldiers out of a secure position by a feigned flight and then defeated them soundly in open country.

In general, the Flemings could not reckon on terrain as favourable as the Welsh, Scots and Swiss, but they exploited the advantages of brooks and ditches with considerable cunning. In September 1302, at Flines, they did as they had done at Courtrai, and again in 1304 a few days before the battle of Mons-en-Pévèle. In each case the French king had the sense to delay his attack.

At Falkirk and at Bannockburn the Scots derived great advantage from the lie of the land, as we have seen. If the position of the foot-soldiers was far enough behind the water, and the enemy knights were allowed to cross this obstacle, then the foot-soldiers could fall on the enemy when only part of their forces had crossed. In that case, a large proportion of the enemy cavalry could be annihilated while the obstacle was behind them and the rest were powerless to help. This is just what happened at Stirling Bridge in Scotland in 1297, and demonstrates the great importance of the choice and exploitation of terrain for a battle.

[Ehndras]

Epic read, definitely enjoying this.

[egamma]

Yep. I'm enjoying this thread a bit more than some of the drier material.

[Longmane]

The Position of the Supreme Commander and the Reserve Corps

Up till now, historians of the art of war have maintained that the supreme commander of a medieval army almost always, like ordinary soldiers, fought man to man in battle. But this view is wrong. Delbrück even went so far as to deny the use of tactical reserves. This view was later refuted.

But it is well to be cautious about this. The sovereign does not always appear as supreme commander, but often entrusted tactical command to a proficient and well-known general. At Bouvines, a former Hospitaller, Bishop Guérin, was in command, while King Philip Augustus started by taking part in the battle, but was later kept further back by his own guard. At Worringen John I was fighting but the count of Virneburg was in command. At Fréteval Richard I took part in battle, but kept a good reserve; at Arsuf he led the reserve in the battle. In a minor battle at Jaffa in 1192, he also led the reserve, which consisted of knights and was positioned behind the foot-soldiers.


We are badly informed about the position of the commander in many battles, because the account is not sufficiently detailed and therefore no survey can be complete. In any case we know about more than thirty major battles and smaller battles or defensive formations in which the commander stayed with the reserve and thus was able to direct or influence the battle from a distance. There are plenty more examples which could well be added to ours, which have escaped examination because theyhave not been studied in the classic works.

We also know about ten battles in which the commander or sovereign took part personally in the fighting, but had entrusted the leadership of the reserve to a competent nobleman.

If we examine only those battles for which we have detailed and trustworthy accounts, we see that a general custom was to keep a reserve in order to force a decision. It appears also from our sources that the commander of the army usually led his reserve himself. Heermann reached these two conclusions in his work on the battles of the First Crusade and the early years of the kings of Jerusalem. This discovery is very important because it completely contradicts one of the most often expressed and principal objections to medieval warfare as an art.

In addition, it must never be forgotten that medieval armies were very small. The commanders could not allow themselves the luxury of staying out of the fighting with an efficient bodyguard during the whole of the battle, for this would have meant a serious weakening of the forces involved. The commander was thus bound to take an active part, at least during the decisive attack of the reserve. William of Poitiers says in his comparison of William the Conqueror and Julius Caesar: 'For William it would have been neither honorable nor efficient merely to give orders, if he had not at the same time fulfilled his knightly obligations, as he was accustomed to do in other wars.'

From the great diversity of examples which have been quoted here, it seems clear that we cannot generalize from this view. As a knight, a medieval commander had to set an example in battle, but that is a general custom which still holds good today for the subordinate commander. Supreme commanders usually trod a little more carefully. The fighting men often made their generals act sensibly. In this we have also to reckon with the tendency of a biographer who wants to glorify his commander, which was certainly the case with William of Poitiers.

The use of the reserve was naturally not always necessary, indeed its use depended on the terrain, the enemy's dispositions, and on all sorts of circumstances which often escape us since in many cases the sources do not tell us why a certain plan was adopted for the battle. If there was an overwhelming superiority of numbers over the enemy, it was not necessary to have a reserve. It could also be superfluous in a surprise attack.

There is an interesting example of this in the battle of Ascalon in 1099. The crusaders advanced in perfect order before the battle. They made nine formations which marched up in three lines. Three units made up the advance guard, three the rear-guard, and three were in the middle, so that these troops could very quickly form a front in any direction. The center could always act as reserve while the other two lines protected their front and rear. This excellent plan for the march was not, however, used for the battle. Then six of the units advanced close to each other. Now it is quite possible that some formations stayed rather behind in relation to the others, and made a second line extending the length of the front.  In this case it was an attack in echelon, of which examples have already been cited. But this explanation is not necessary, in that we find a better one in the course of the battle itself.

According to Ibn al-Athir, the Egyptians were surprised by the quick attack of the crusaders. In their account of the battle the chroniclers confirm that the combat was very short. Duke Robert of Normandy cut down the enemy standard-bearer immediately. Tancred at once pressed through, right into the enemy's camp.

Although Christian sources relate that the enemy was ready for battle, it is quite possible that the crusaders partly surprised the Egyptians. In that case Godfrey of Bouillon seems to have decided that it was best to carry out the attack with all the knights at his command on a broad front. Whatever the truth may be, the attack was amazingly successful in a very short time.

The enemy's dispositions and the type of terrain could also be decisive. When fighting took place on a broad front and flank and rear attacks were to be feared, it was sometimes impossible to hold a reserve—e.g. at Bouvines in 1214.

The attack of a hidden reserve which took the enemy by surprise could also be decisive. At Visé in 1106 foot-soldiers of the communal army of Liége were placed in ambush, while the knights of duke Henry of Limbourg and count Godfrey of Namur attacked the German knights and feigned a flight. The knights of king Henry V were defeated. In 1112, king Louis VI was beaten in storming the fortress of Le Puiset because the enemy had concealed a reserve in ambush. During the siege of Thouars in 1129 Geoffrey V, count of Anjou and Maine and duke of Normandy, hid 500 knights in ambush in a wood. When the besieged forces made one of their usual sorties, Geoffrey withdrew past his reserve, which immediately fell on the enemy from behind. The garrison was overcome, and fled back in disorder to the town, but the besiegers managed to follow them in and capture the fortress.

[Longmane]

Retreat and Flight from the Field of Battle

Withdrawal from the battlefield was a very tricky problem, especially if the enemy was still in contact. Highly mobile bands of knights could mount a tremendous attack on the troops who were withdrawing, and turn an orderly retreat into flight.  Withdrawal was a very serious problem for an army of foot-soldiers faced by an army of knights. It was less difficult for knights faced by footsoldiers, or for an army consisting of knights and foot-soldiers. The most difficult type of withdrawal of all was that of a wholly or partly beaten army when scattered remnants were taking to their heels.

If the commanders had decided to retreat, they first sent away supplies with the provision waggons, then the foot-soldiers, while the knights followed on to hold up the enemy in case of need, for a strong rearguard was absolutely necessary.

The precise moment for the start of the retreat depended on the tactical situation, or on the alertness of the garrison if the besiegers were attacking a fortress. We have already seen that the army of Baldwin of Boulogne stayed awake all night while it was in contact with the enemy, and started to retreat at dawn. The baggage train and foot-soldiers were protected by a strong rearguard of knights.

In the crusades and in the kingdom of Jerusalem the rearguard was often reinforced by crossbowmen, who were intended to keep enemy archers at a distance. This was so at Arsuf, where the crusaders under Richard I were in contact with the enemy during the march. There the baggage train and the main force of the foot-soldiers were protected by the rear-guard, which was made up of bands of knights and crossbowmen on foot, and by a flank-guard. Louis VII also had flank-guards and a rear-guard, which was reinforced by archers, during his march across Asia Minor in 1147–48.

The last part of the march of the French army which moved out of Tournai to Bouvines in 1214 was done in contact with the enemy's advance guard. Philip Augustus had formed a strong rear-guard, and placed it under the command of Bishop Guérin, the tactical commander. This corps was made up of knights, light cavalry, and crossbowmen. It had to halt five times, and fall back, still fighting, on the main force of the French army, but it succeeded in making enough delay to deploy the royal army completely.


When Villehardouin and Manassier de Lisle had saved the remains of the emperor Baldwin's bands of knights on 4 April 1205, it was decided to give up the siege of Adrianople and to withdraw. But this was bound to be dangerous, because their enemy, the king of Bulgaria, had great numbers of light cavalry.  Villehardouin and his corps stayed in battle array outside their camp until nightfall. Then the Doge of Venice moved off with the main army, leaving Villehardouin to follow with the rear-guard. The Doge left many torches burning in the camp, to give the impression that it was still occupied, but they took everyone, even the wounded. The enemy noticed nothing at all in the dark. By noon of the following day the retreating troops had marched so quickly that they were 46 miles away. Their strategic retreat towards Rodosto was also most remarkable: they covered more than 83 miles in less than 48 hours.


Between 1302 and 1304 the French armies retreated several times in face of the Flemings. Twice the withdrawal almost turned into flight, namely on 29 September 1302 and 10 July 1303.  In September 1302 the armies were separated by the Scarpe. The royal army was able to move off unhindered by the Flemings, but morale was at a very low ebb in the French camp, where the battle of Courtrai was not forgotten, and the withdrawal was so panic-stricken that it resembled flight.


On 10 July the two armies were facing each other again, close to St Omer. The constable of France had six companies of knights, and French and Lombard foot-soldiers. A council of war was held, and most of the nobles were in favour of fighting, but the constable refused in view of the great losses the royal army had suffered the year before at Courtrai, and he gave the order to retreat. The nobles had to return to the towns which they had to defend against the Flemings.  Each soldier was to follow the banner to which he belonged. First the waggons were driven off, then the foot set out. The knights stayed facing the Flemings in battle order. There was a watercourse, probably the Aa, between them. When the Flemings noticed the enemy's retreat, they first thought they were going to encircle the Flemish army. So the French army was able to march off unhindered, even though the withdrawal was disorderly.


On the battlefield of Arques on 4 April 1303, however, the French knights manoeuvred methodically and in good order. One company after another moved off, covered by the rest of the army. When William of Jülich noticed this, he moved up with the Flemish foot-soldiers to attack.
Then the knights halted, and made as though they would attack, and this threat made the Flemings re-arrange themselves for a defensive battle.  As soon as they stood still, the French began to retreat again. William moved again, and again the knights came to a standstill. While withdrawing to St Omer they had to re-deploy their battle-array five or six times in order to keep the Flemings at a distance.


On 13 August 1304 the royal army was again in retreat under the command of king Philip the Fair. The Flemings had advanced towards the French camp as far as Mons-en-Pévèle. They had taken up a strong position with marshes before and behind them. The king divided the French troops into 15 divisions and advanced to give battle, after knighting many squires.  Crossbowmen of both armies were ready for preliminary skirmishing, when several over-eager Flemings started to shoot. But closer inspection showed that the Flemish position was too strong, so the king decided to withdraw to his camp. He himself led the rearguard which was to cover the withdrawal, and the retreat was carried out without mishap.


The Flemings also took special precautions when they retreated after the siege of a fortified town. After the retreat of the French army on 10 July 1303 part of the French army stayed at St Omer. However the town was well defended, and nine days later the Flemings moved off. They set out at night, leaving a strong rear-guard behind them on a hill until the baggage train was safely away.

The same year the Flemings besieged Tournai during a 47 day campaign. When they raised the siege, the soldiers set fire to the huts which they had built out of branches and straw. Thick smoke prevented the enemy from seeing that the Flemings had left a strong rear-guard behind. The Flemish foot-soldiers moved off covered by a band of cavalry. When the French knights made an attack they crashed into the Flemish rearguard and suffered heavy losses.

When an army took to flight, commanders tried to protect their fleeing troops with a hastily formed rearguard, or with the reserve corps if that were not already involved in the fighting. When the army of Bohemond and Tancred suddenly took to flight on the banks of the Balîkh in May 1104, both leaders collected a corps, which later had to hold the enemy in check under Tancred. When Louis VI fled at the siege of Chambly in 1102, he managed to regroup a small body of men and use them as a rearguard. 

In general a commander could reckon on his bravest men sacrificing themselves or using their vast experience to save the terrified fugitives. In such a case, the prince's own faithful followers made his own escape possible: Otto's followers saved him at Bouvines, Edward II was brought to safety at Bannockburn by the knight Giles of Argentan, who was no coward and returned to meet his death on the battlefield.

Stout resistance by some troops, who were overwhelmed where they made their stand, often made possible the flight of demoralized units, who would throw away weapons and equipment so as to get out of the reach of the heavily armed pursuers. The victors often moved cautiously for fear of falling into an ambush.

At Courtrai the French rearguard let the baggage train move off while the knights stood by in case of attack, and in the end the foot-soldiers got away as well. But when the Flemings went over to the attack, the rearguard in their turn panicked and fled. For the foot-soldiers such a flight often meant disaster. Quick-moving knights could ride down the fugitives with heavy horses, and kill them.

After the unsuccessful attack on the French camp at Cassel in 1328 the main body of Flemings was surrounded by knights but they took up a circular formation and defended themselves so stoutly that many knights were unhorsed. It seemed virtually impossible to destroy the Flemings by force of arms, but then a section of French knights withdrew, leaving a way through. The Flemings tried to escape, but could not get away in good order: they fled but were fiercely chased, and many of them were killed.


Detailed examination of a few actual battles, beginning with two from the First Crusade will help to throw light on the practical solutions to some of the tactical problems of the day.

[Longmane]

The Battle of the Lake of Antioch, 9 February 1098

On 8 February, during the siege of Antioch, the crusaders were warned of the approach of enemy relief troops. Thereupon Bohemond held a council of war in the tent of the bishop of Le Puy. He proposed that the foot-soldiers should be left in the camp to guard it and to deal with any sortie of the garrison of Antioch, and this was agreed. The enemy was then near the castle of Harenc, beyond the bridge over the Orontes.

As soon as night fell, Bohemond moved off in the dark with the knights, to prevent the garrison noticing anything and warning the approaching relief troops. Bohemond's army was made up of about 700 knights. He wanted to fight between the lake of Antioch and the Orontes, where the
restricted front prevented the Turks from attacking the crusaders' flank or from surrounding them, and he kept his men concealed until daybreak. 

Early in the morning he sent out scouts to reconnoiter the enemy formations, and find out their exact positions and probable intentions. They saw the Turks moving up along the river in two large divisions, the stronger in the second line. The scouts hurried back to report. The other leaders entrusted the conduct of the battle to Bohemond. He ordered them to take up battle positions, making each prince responsible for the command and good order of his men. They were drawn up in six formations, five advancing together towards the enemy, while Bohemond followed with the sixth.

Fighting broke out against the enemy's front line, which was thrown back. Then came the most powerful body of the Turks, who attacked and drove back the crusaders. This had the effect of packing the Turkish formations more tightly, the second line had assimilated the first and both had attacked again. Bohemond then ordered his constable, Robert fitzGerard, to attack with part of the reserve. The whole force of the enemy was forced to fight the heavily armoured western knights in the narrow space between the lake and the river.

The attack by the reserve was decisive. With banners flying, the constable dashed at the Turkish formations and drove them off. The other formations of crusaders, relieved by the counter-attack, re-formed their ranks and attacked again. The enemy was put to flight and fiercely pursued for ten miles.

This battle is interesting for the following reasons:

1. Through choosing to fight in a confined space the crusaders prevented an outflanking movement by their enemies, as their flanks were well protected.

2. The knights made their main attack only at the moment when the Turks were forming a dense mass, just after their advance guard had withdrawn to the main body, and both had attacked the Christians. They had thrown in all their strength and could not collect their troops again after they had been thrown back: they were nevertheless fiercely pursued.

3. Part of the reserve was thrown in at exactly the right moment, and this proved decisive. The rest of the reserve was there still under the commander, who could use it for support during the pursuit.

[Longmane]

The Sortie and the Battle of Antioch, 28 June 1098

After the crusaders had taken Antioch they were besieged in the city by an enemy force under Kerbogha, Atabeg of Mosul, and the citadel of Antioch was still occupied and fiercely defended by an enemy garrison. The crusaders were extremely hard pressed and suffered severely from hunger: the crisis was so extreme that some nobles even deserted. In this desperate situation came the discovery of the Holy Lance. Although there was some doubt about the authenticity of the find it gave tremendously valuable moral uplift to the besieged Christians, who gained fresh courage.

Bohemond wanted to make use of this revival of morale to fight a decisive battle. An embassy was sent to Kerbogha. Peter the Hermit and Herluin, who knew the Seldjuk language, were entrusted with the task. Peter the Hermit delivered an ultimatum to the Seldjuk commander requiring him to raise the siege, but he came back without having succeeded.

The preparations for battle lasted three days. In view of the coming battle the horses were fed with such grain as the knights still had. Godfrey of Bouillon himself had no charger left, but received one from Raymond of St Gilles, who was ill. During these three days the army fasted, prayed, and did penance. Masses were offered and alms distributed, and finally they all received communion. The morale of the crusaders was at one of its highest peaks. They preferred a quick death on the field of battle to a slow death by starvation.

28 June was the decisive day. Four grand divisions were formed within the city. Each division was composed of two corps: one of cavalry and one of foot-soldiers. The knights and their followers were to fight under the command of their prince, and group themselves under his banner.

Hugh of Vermandois, count Robert II of Flanders and Robert of Normandy were to march at the head of the army with their troops, in the first division. Godfrey of Bouillon with his men and the Burgundians constituted the second division. Bishop Adhémar of Le Puy commanded the third division which consisted of the warriors from Aquitaine and Provence. Raymond of Aguilers went with them bearing the Holy Lance. Bohemond led the fourth division, the reserve.

Raymond of Toulouse stayed in the city with 200 men to pin down the garrison in the citadel, stationed on the wall opposite this citadel. A detachment of foot-soldiers who marched in front of the knights was to advance or stop at the order of the commanders. The knights were to follow the foot-soldiers and protect their rear.

The excitement among the crusaders was intense, as they felt the hour of battle drawing near. Each knight had prepared his charger and his equipment to the highest degree: they had been too busy to think much about death, and this short-lived tension gave expression to their deepest feelings. They wanted to fight quickly in order to shake off the feeling of the oppressive waiting. Bishops, priests, clerks and monks went with them, wearing vestments, carrying crucifixes, praying and encouraging the fighting-men. Others stood on the city walls and blessed the troops.


When the first division of crusaders had gone out of the city gate and crossed the bridge over the Orontes, Watthab-ibn-Mahmud, one of Kerbogha's commanders, advised him to attack the Christians at once. Kerbogha refused, since a hasty attack could put only part of the Christian forces out of action.

Those who have made a study of the battle have wondered why he let the whole army of western knights come out of Antioch unhindered. It may be that he was well content to fight in the open since his efforts to take the city had failed. Considering the state of the crusaders' army, their behavior during the siege and the desertions from their ranks, he must have thought that victory over this little army was assured. Probably he was surprised not only by the knights' courageous sortie, but also by their speed in making it. But Kerbogha had first of all to collect his army and deploy it, and certainly thought he would be able to kill a reasonable number of
Christians.

In February the crusaders' army consisted of 700 knights with horses fit for battle, or anyway well under 1,000, but the siege had reduced their numbers considerably, and by that time it was very small. Ralph of Caen speaks of about 600 knights in this battle. The number of foot-soldiers is more difficult to fix, but there were possibly only about 3,000. In this case, the advancing army would have no great depth, and if they came out four or five abreast through the gate and over the bridge, the line would have been about 120 to 150 riders long, and about 600 ranks of foot. By taking great care in packing the formations tightly, it is possible that a cavalry column measured only 420 to 525 metres for the horsemen, and 900 metres for the foot, say 1,320 to 1,425 metres in all.

They must of course have realized that there was a strong chance of the Turks making a lightning attack, and would have taken the necessary precautions. In a normal advance at a pace of about 5 km an hour this army would have covered a kilometre in 12 minutes, so that the whole column could have got out of the gate in 18 minutes. Actually, the far end of the column could have been stationed about 1.5 km from the gate, and closer in the side streets.

Of course the troops were moved out rather quickly, but even if we suppose that the movement was not perfectly ordered, we can still assume that the whole army was out within 30 minutes, and they could afford to be crowded for so short a distance. Indeed, even if there were far more foot-soldiers than has been supposed, the whole garrison could have been out within an hour, in other words, so quickly that Kerbogha could only have taken counter-action if his army had been assembled and ready, which of course is rarely the case.

Raymond of Aguilers, speaking of what Kerbogha did, says that at first the Seldjuk could have hindered the crusaders' breakout. According to him, and to Fulcher of Chartres, the Emir was playing chess in his tent at the time. The Gesta Tancredi  tells the same story, so it appears that the element of surprise was on the side of the crusaders.

Other sources speak of Kerbogha hoping to be able to destroy the whole army of the Franks in the open field. The Anonymous has this version, and Moslem accounts confirm this, adding that their army felt certain of victory, because Kerbogha would annihilate all the crusaders' army in the battle. Now that he had the chance to win a single decisive victory over the besieged Christians he wanted to exploit it fully. The speed of the crusaders' advance in fact left him no other choice.

The Christian knights formed up behind their leaders' banners. The first division deployed in line with its right flank on the Orontes. The second division marched behind the first, and deployed in line on the left of the first; so did the third. A wide front of about two miles was occupied towards the mountains. There the left flank would be protected by these obstacles. The Turks intended to use their customary tactics: they withdrew before the advancing crusaders, and sent one formation round to the rear of their opponents.

But this manoeuvre was observed in time, and Bohemond had the sense not to throw in his reserve at once. A band of knights was quickly formed under Rainald, who advanced towards those Turks who were attacking the left flank of the crusaders. The knights meanwhile had pushed through their foot-soldiers in order to be able to charge the enemy's light cavalry more easily.

The Turks first attacked the foot-soldiers protecting the rear of the Christian left flank. But the men of the crusaders' army quickly turned round and formed a circle so that they could beat off the attacks from the threatening quarter. The arrival of Rainald's band of knights proved decisive. The Turks were thrown back and began to flee, setting fire to the dry grass to hinder the Christians and to signal to their own side as they went.

The units of the first division under Hugh of Vermandois, Robert of Flanders and Robert of Normandy had made the first attack along the front, followed by the division of Godfrey of Bouillon, and the division of Adhémar of Le Puy. They fought against the main strength of the enemy. After the failure of the outflanking movement the Turks gave way under incessant pressure. They fled incontinently, hotly pursued by the Christian knights, who chose immediate pursuit rather than booty, and chased them a long way from the battlefield. Afterwards they found immensely rich spoils in Kerbogha's camp.

From this brief account it is again apparent that the small size of knightly armies must not be forgotten. It made it possible for an army to move very quickly, and to deploy in open country. In this case they were able to render Kerbogha's counter-attacks ineffectual, and even to surprise him in some measure. While the Turks used their normal tactics, the crusaders were clever enough to keep a reserve and not to throw it in at once, and to make a new formation to deal with an unforeseen threat. It is also worth noting that the foot-soldiers marched in front of the knights in the beginning of the battle and that they offered very good resistance to the enemy's cavalry.

[Longmane]

The Battle of Thielt, 21 June 1128

The battle of Thielt, or Axpoel, although it had no great effect on the general course of the struggle between two claimants for the title of count in Flanders, is however remarkable for its tactics. It shows clearly that small armies of knights were sometimes able to solve tactical problems which, at a first glance, seem insoluble. But a thorough study shows that such situations might arise in many battles.

The general circumstances are well known. In February 1128 a rebellion broke out against count William Clito. On 30 March the communes of Ghent and Bruges chose Thierry of Alsace as count and two important barons, Daniel of Termonde and Iwain of Alost, did homage to him.
These powerful nobles brought him the support of some of the Flemish knights, and in addition the rebels could soon count on the help of Lille and then of the men of Ypres, who supported the new count secretly at first but later openly.

Armed conflict broke out between William Clito, supported by most of the knights, and Thierry, the candidate supported by the towns, who was helped by a minority of vassals. Although the citizens, 'the power of the future' as Pirenne has called them, were on Thierry's side, it was by no means certain that he would win, as the story of the battle of Thielt shows.

On June 18 and 19, 1128, Thierry of Alsace gathered a strong army at Ghent, in the Four 'Ambachten' (Axel, Hulst, Assenede and Boekhoute) and the Land of Waas.  Armed with material for siege he went to Axpoel near Thielt to besiege the fortified manor of a follower of William Clito, the knight Fulk. The men of Bruges came on 20 June, led by their burgrave, Gervase ofPraat, whose army was also reinforced by men from the coastal region.

But William Clito had observed these troop movements and went out at once to spy out the terrain and enemy army. The next day he collected his knights at dawn. They made their confession together to the abbot of Oudenburg and the count and his men made a vow to protect the Church and the poor from henceforward. The knights had their hair cut, threw aside their ordinary clothes and put on their armor. They quickly advanced towards Thielt to relieve Fulk's castle.

The exact strength of the armies is not known. But there are useful indications in the story as told by Galbert of Bruges.

William Clito appears once with more than 400 knights and had 400 with him at the siege of Alost. He certainly had more than 400 here, let us say 450. In any case Thierry had fewer, possibly about 300. But he had part of the communal armies of Bruges and Ghent under his command and foot-soldiers from the Four 'Ambachten', the Land of Waas and the coastal strip. In view of the small role they played, we can set the figure low, and say 1,500.

Thierry had to make sure that the siege of the fortress of Fulk was thoroughly maintained, and that his siege material was safely guarded. If we allow 500 men for this, then he must have had 1,000 left for battle. Together with his knights, who were inferior in number, these men could offer battle to the enemy with some hope of victory.

It seems that William arrived at the field of battle with a plan in mind. The previous day's reconnaissance had given him some idea of the strength of the enemy army. He knew that they had to fight in difficult tactical circumstances of the siege.

His plan was clear: he placed one of his three bands of knights in ambush behind the hill he had reconnoitered on 20 June. The attack was to come from the other two, one led by William himself, the other apparently by the standard-bearer Riquart of Woumen. They were to withdraw in due course to the third company of knights, who were only to join in after the first and second, pursued by the enemy, reappeared over the top of the hill. In this way Thierry's knights would be separated from his foot-soldiers and they could be separately beaten. The foot-soldiers could not, of course, follow the cavalry during a speedy pursuit and Thierry's knights would become scattered during the chase.

As the plan was explained to them in advance, William's knights could be quickly re-grouped while the reserve, in close ranks, rushed out of its ambush to attack the scattered or at least somewhat disordered pursuers. If the plan had not been made and explained beforehand and the third body had been an ordinary reserve, William Clito would have had much greater difficulty in collecting up his scattered knights again and in their flight they might easily have taken the reserve with them.

William Clito appeared on the hill with two troops out of three. As soon as Thierry observed the enemy he also made two formations, the first under his own command with Gervase of Praat, the second under count Frederick. The knights were to fight in front followed by the foot, who were to capture or kill those of the enemy who were unhorsed. Daniel of Termonde was in command of Thierry's knights during the pursuit. We have thus the following dispositions:
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                       
                                                                          ................................................................
                                                                                          3rd group in hiding
                                                                          ................................................................

                                                .....................................................        ........................................................
                                                                William Clito                                    Riquart of Woumen
                                                .....................................................        .......................................................

                                                .....................................................        ........................................................
                                                          Thierry  & Gervase                                        Frederick                       = Militia
                                                .....................................................        ........................................................
                                                .....................................................        ........................................................
                                                                    Foot                                                         Foot                        =pedites 
                                                ....................................................         .......................................................


                                                 

Once the troops were in battle positions both armies rode at each other with lances couched. Daniel hoped to penetrate directly into the enemy line in order to make a real breakthrough, but count Frederick was unhorsed in the first shock. On the other side Riquart of Woumen shared the same fate, was taken prisoner and fettered.

Both counts took part in the fight, just like their ordinary knights.  Once a lance was broken, or became useless in hand-to-hand fighting, swords were drawn. However, William Clito realized that he must not let his troops be mauled too much and that if he got too close he would have to deal with the enemy foot, who might turn things to the advantage of his opponent. He therefore gave the signal to retreat.

Daniel started the pursuit with Thierry's knights, and advanced to the top of the hill. There an unpleasant surprise awaited him: he was attacked by a fresh, well-ordered company of about 150 knights.

William Clito collected his retreating troops again. A powerful charge by the reserve found Daniel's knights defenceless. In a few seconds the pursuit was changed into a disorderly flight and William's knights then appeared as victors on the hilltop and rushed down to the plain where Thierry, with the foot-soldiers, was amazed to see the enemy coming back.

Panic broke out among the inexperienced troops. Thierry himself fled with his followers, throwing down their weapons as they went. He reached Bruges with only ten knights. But when William saw that the enemy troops were throwing away their weapons and fleeing in panic, he was ready to run further risks to turn this tactical victory into a great success. He made his knights take off their coats of mail so that they could ride faster and take more prisoners. The pursuit was a calamity for the Brugeois. Galbert describes it as something unique: 'such fierce pursuit and the taking of so many prisoners had never been known in this part of the world before this war.'

We must not allow ourselves to be misled by the small forces involved, for many medieval battles were fought with armies just as small. The battle of Thielt is remarkable for the way in which William Clito put one company of knights out of three in ambush, after making a reconnaissance of the terrain.

This Norman, who had several times previously misled the enemy, was perfectly aware of the weakness of a victorious army during a pursuit, exploited it very cleverly in ordering the reserve to attack at the psychological moment and in rallying his knights behind the reserve. His own audacious pursuit shows very well what dangers were involved in such an exploitation of a tactical success.

It shows most clearly that in such a case it was necessary to have a rearguard or reserve in order to protect the knights who became scattered while chasing the beaten enemy. A fresh reserve of this kind was used after the victory at Fréteval (1194) in the army of Richard I, after the victory at Muret (1213) by Simon de Montfort and after the victory at Philippopoli (1208) by Henry I of Constantinople.

[Longmane]

Although this and my coming next two posts are from a different chapter then the others, I thought I'd post them here as they seem fit in.

The Knights Fighting on Foot

The knights were the complete warriors of western society; they could fight mounted and on foot. When it was necessary or preferable, they dismounted for combat.  At Louvain in 891, when king Arnulf could not attack the Viking camp with his cavalry, most of his men made a successful assault on foot.

During the following centuries, the knights were often obliged to attack a fortress as foot-soldiers. In 1112, Louis the Fat and his knights attacked on foot the castle of Le Puiset. In May 1197 the knights of king Richard I stormed the castle of Milli, near Beauvais. William the Marshal was directing a part of the attack and climbed a ladder to take the wall.  In most wars the knights defended their castles fighting on foot.

The knights also fought on foot in the naval battles of the middle ages. They were ready to fight dismounted during a landing operation at Constantinople on 6 July 1203.  On 12 April 1204 during the attack on Constantinople by the fleet, knights fought also on foot.  In the army of St Louis near Damietta (5 June 1249) Joinville and many other knights landed on foot and established a beachhead.  The Flemish army of Guy and John of Dampierre, reinforced by French knights, tried to land at Westkapelle in Walcheren on 4 July 1253. It became a disastrous defeat.

The knights dismounted also to stiffen the ranks of the foot-soldiers and to encourage them. The dismounted knights would not flee on horseback and would stay with the foot-soldiers till the bitter end or the victory.

Robert Guiscard used knights for such missions. At Tinchebray (1106), king Henry I dismounted with his retinue and took up a position in the middle of the foot-soldiers. His opponent, Robert of Normandy, did the same. At Brémule (1119) Henry I ordered knights to dismount and fight on foot. At Bourg Théroulde (1124), Norman knights increased the effectiveness of their archers by dismounting and fighting in the ranks of the foot-soldiers. At Northallerton (1136) many Anglo-Norman knights dismounted and took up positions among the foot-soldiers. At Lincoln (1141), the second line of king Stephen's army consisted of foot-soldiers reinforced by dismounted knights.

The knights fought also on foot when the terrain was too difficult for combat on horseback, or when there were too many obstacles. Sometimes they preferred to defend a small passage on foot.

As leaders of the foot-soldiers, the knights fought on foot in the defence of fortified towns and castles. On a battlefield they gave strength to the formation, by taking place in the first rank of the foot-soldiers. They gave moral support, for they could not abandon the foot. In Flanders some hundreds of knights fought with the foot-soldiers at Courtrai, Arques, and Mons-en-Pévèle.

At Boroughbridge (1322), English knights and men-at-arms dismounted, and together with pikemen they defended the northern end of the bridge. They placed other pikemen in the form of a schiltron, as the Scots did, to defend a ford. They used archers to ward off the enemy's attack. Their adversaries attacked the defenders of the bridge with dismounted knights, and their cavalry attempted to cross the ford, but they were defeated. Ten years later these tactics were perfected at the battle of Dupplin Moor. In 1333, at Halidon Hill, the skilful combination of English archers with armored nobility on foot and on horseback enabled Edward III to defeat the Scots completely, and to establish the military superiority of the English armies firmly.

During the Hundred Years War, the French knights adopted the English fashion of fighting on foot in 1351. They dismounted at Maupertuis (1356), Cocherel (1364), Auray (1364), Najera (1367) and so on.

[Longmane]

This is another of those pieces not from the same chapter as most of the others.

Mass Flight and Panic

Besides considering the ordinary feeling of fear in the individual, we must also look at the question of mass panic in order to see what influence fear had upon the knights' tactics when they fought together against other knights or against foot-soldiers. One of the finest descriptions of panic in an army of knights and foot-soldiers comes from Ralph of Caen.

In early May 1104 a battle was fought at Harran, not far from the River Balîkh, by the troops of Baldwin of Bourg, Bohemond, and Tancred, against the Moslems. Baldwin's unit was quickly defeated and he was taken prisoner, but Bohemond and Tancred were victorious, and spent the night on the battlefield, on the enemy side of the river. The banks were very steep, and there was only one fordable place, on which the Norman leaders set a guard during the night, in order to prevent escape and to keep the enemy from gaining control of it.

As the night wore on, the men became increasingly uneasy and the fear of death crept over them. The first little groups of fugitives were easily driven back by the sentinels, but their numbers grew steadily until finally they overpowered the defenders of the ford. A panic flight began. Bohemond and Tancred were forced to organize a retreat as best they could, and Tancred stayed in the rear guard to cover the retreat and flight.

'While the Turks lay sunk in sleep, the Christian knights fled, casting aside as they went all their costly possessions, their clothes, tents, silver and gold vessels, everything that was heavy and might delay them in their flight, even their weapons, which protect the lives of those who bear them.  Rain had made the roads bad and turned the dust into mud; the horses slid about and their tails seemed to drag them down. Archbishop Bernard was fleeing with the others, his mule trotting along covered in mud. No one was chasing them, but it was as if the enemy were at their heels with swords drawn and bowstrings taut. The archbishop's countenance was troubled, and his heart heavy with fear.

He called out to his fleeing companions, and begged them: 'Listen to your father, my children, cut off the tail that hangs down behind my mount, which is not just slowing me down, but is bringing me to a standstill. Cut it off, I tell you, for the animal will be lighter, and I shall not blush for riding a mule with no tail. Cut it off, and God forgive you your sins. I grant full absolution to the man who cuts off this tail.'

Many crusaders turned a deaf ear and galloped on, so hard of hearing did their terror make them, nor did anyone have sympathy to spare for his friends, so much was he taken up with his own fear. The archbishop had grown hoarse when a knight who was fleeing with him at last did what he asked, on condition that he received the promised absolution. Both felt the relief at once, the knight freed from his sins and the animal from his tail. So the knight reaped the double harvest of a mule's tail and absolution by sowing a benediction. The archbishop gave him benediction with heart, mouth and hand, and as soon as the knight had got the benediction as well as the mule's tail he trotted off to Edessa with the archbishop, fleeing with him for whom he had made flight possible.'


In a battle under the walls of Acre in 1189, panic broke out in part of the victorious Christian army when some German knights were trying to catch an Arab horse and their pursuit was taken by the others to be flight. This local panic gave Saladin the chance to turn a defeat into victory, though not a decisive one. 

During the campaigns following the Fourth Crusade and the conquest of the Byzantine Empire, Baldwin I, formerly count of Flanders and Hainault, was taken prisoner close to the walls of Adrianople when he went to the help of the imprudent Louis of Blois. Some of the defeated troops were able to flee, thanks to the intervention of Villehardouin, who provided cover them with a fresh corps which had been drawn up outside the city walls. But some of the fugitives turned in panic and galloped back into the camp, instead of strengthening the ranks of their friends.

The story of the flight of the French rearguard at the battle of the Golden Spurs near Courtrai on the afternoon and evening of 11 July 1302 is also well-known.

'From the towers of the church of Notre Dame of Tournai, of the abbey of St Martin and of the city, they could be seen fleeing along the roads, through hedges and fields, in such numbers that no one who had not seen it would believe it ... In the outskirts of the city and in the villages there were so many starving knights and footsoldiers that it was a frightful sight. Those who managed to find food outside the town bartered their equipment for it.  All that night and the next day those who came into the city were so terrified that many of them could not even eat.'

When the Flemish forces made a surprise attack on the evening of 18 August 1304 near the village of Mons-en-Pévèle, the French knights fled by whole conrois and batailles beyond their camp. Many of them never came back to the battlefield. 'Then one could see troops defeated without any reason, for no warlike feat was responsible for their defeat.'

Besides these examples in which panic was caused by fear of the enemy, or by a surprise attack, or a growing feeling of unrest and anxiety during the night after a disastrous battle, there were also occasions when mass flight from the camp was in no way due to enemy action.

In 1102, the young Louis the Fat was besieging the stronghold of Chambly, which belonged to Mathieu de Beaumont. During the night there was a thunderstorm: torrents of rain and thunderclaps so shook the morale of the troops and their horses that many thought they were going to die. Utterly demoralized by physical suffering, wet clothes and the cold, perhaps also influenced by the fear of the unleashed powers of nature, some of the men got ready to depart early in the morning. When the dawn came, they set several tents on fire, which was usually a signal for retreat, and set off. The whole army did the same. Louis the Fat had difficulty in assembling a small unit to cover the flight even partially, and many fugitives were taken prisoner.

In April 1194, Baldwin VIII of Hainault had a similar experience at Arquennes, when he was preparing to storm Nivelles. During the night there was such a violent thunderstorm that horses and men were terrified. At daybreak not only the allies sent by the king of France, but also the knights, horsemen and foot-soldiers of the count all went off without permission, so that scarcely a seventh of the army was left with Baldwin. 'The count was astonished at this, and those who were with him, and the fugitives themselves were also surprised.' The prince was obliged to go home having achieved nothing.

It is a mistake to explain these two examples of panic in terms of lack of discipline. It is clear that the strictest discipline is no use when a whole unit or a great part of an army takes to flight in panic. Even the best troops may be subject to panic as many wars in history have shown. One of the best means of avoiding panic in battle is the use of two or three fighting lines in depth. If the first line wavers, it can be intercepted by the second or third, who are out of danger and whose morale is not affected. The soldiers who are tempted to break ranks in a panic are usually then halted and rounded up not far from the front.