BattleMaster Community
Community => Background => Topic started by: songqu88@gmail.com on April 09, 2011, 12:36:49 AM
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The current battle system is pretty simple (but also strangely complex with its unpredictable unit behaviors). Two forces take opposite sides, and go at each other head on.
What records exist out there about Medieval battles, both accounts of the battles, and preferably, reliable sources about the formations and tactics used? I am told that the Medieval Europeans really did fight like BM portrays, but I'd like for something from the time, like a treatise on battle by some competent vassal or someone related to the military scene.
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I have not more than skimmed any of these. But, for your reading pleasure:
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/cde-nicea.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/cde-antioch.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/cde-jlem.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/fulk2.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/cde-letters.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1187ernoul.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1187hattin.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1187saladin.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/arab-poitiers732.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/732tours.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/einhard-wars1.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1066malmesbury.html
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/froissart1.html
http://www.r3.org/bosworth/ballad.html
Also, a later Medieval battle in the War of the Roses:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bosworth_Field
Bosworth Field has had some fairly significant archaeology done on it, if I remember correctly.
Textual evidence for Medieval battles isn't as abundant as we might like. Fighting manuals exist for later-Medieval German and Italian swordsmen.
For the most part, the fighting BM simulates is pretty accurate for simulations of major battles in, say, the Crusades, or the Hundred Years War. The only thing BM does not simulate well is siege warfare. But, once Dwilight gets heavily settled, maybe we will see some of that, what with the ring-regions.
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This blog is a pain to search through and contains a *lot* of unrelated material, but there are also some real gems in there.
http://warandgame.com/
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It's not so much the scarcity of books or thesis's etc concerning such things that's the problem, as rather abundant on the whole, but a matter of not just finding the rascals in the first place but also sorting the chaff from the corn.
As while there's plenty of books etc out there, and indeed themselves are mostly very informative and the like, the problem I've found is that while the majority are usually lightweight in the detail needed, and as such usually leave you no wiser then before ???, those that aren't can often suffer from other shortcomings, ie as while latter day authors (19th century onwards usually) sometimes fall into the trap of throwing the baby out with the bath water when it comes to eyewitness accounts of the period etc, (ie Just because one thing sir cuthbert said didn't seem kosher they don't just omit it, but actually change it to what they believe happened) the earlier ones facts can sometimes be skewed by bias, either deliberate or otherwise.
I myself have been very lucky in acquiring two excellent tomes on the subject, one I learnt about at our town library (while on a visit searching for that other damn elusive book ) and the other through it being quoted from, and highly lauded, in a thesis by a Professor and fellow arthur on the subject.
I can't remember their names exactly at the moment, as still on the road (nearly 2 weeks now without hitting home-base ;D ) and unable access my home PC let alone actually lay my hands on them, but once get chance I'll post the titles and authors, as think would find at least the second one fascinating and highly informative, ie gives the complete order of march, making camp and battle preparations for the templars etc, and likewise eyewitness accounts of battles from such people as Saladin's son himself.
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The current battle system is pretty simple (but also strangely complex with its unpredictable unit behaviors). Two forces take opposite sides, and go at each other head on.
What records exist out there about Medieval battles, both accounts of the battles, and preferably, reliable sources about the formations and tactics used? I am told that the Medieval Europeans really did fight like BM portrays, but I'd like for something from the time, like a treatise on battle by some competent vassal or someone related to the military scene.
The problem with statements like this is the time period covers such a large period of time. The way battles where fought did change significantly over this time.
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The problem with statements like this is the time period covers such a large period of time. The way battles where fought did change significantly over this time.
In such a case the simplest solution would be to look at BM's representation and find the closest historical parallel. There is no problem, only a required approximation.
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In such a case the simplest solution would be to look at BM's representation and find the closest historical parallel. There is no problem, only a required approximation.
In which part of Europe? For example Self economies sprung up late in the eastern part of Europe, and tended to persist past the time the institution was dismantled in western Europe. Some countries like Wales persisted with small "professional" armies with a emphasis on single melee combat while other realms had started to practise "conscription" of peasant levies and the use of formations required by larger forces.
In general combat was a fair bit simpler then we would perhaps suspect, since communication on the battlefield was somewhat difficult. Simple battle plans that could then be tweaked by the battlefield commanders as the situation changed gave maximum flexibility in this regard. Like the early phalanx combat of Greece, set piece battles were common.
This opinion is based on the Military History I learnt while training to be an army officer. We learnt tactics and strategies from many historical ages as a way to demonstrate how limitations of things like communication and logics dictates the available strategic options.
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Who cares what part of Europe? As long as it's somewhere in that general landmass. Who cares about what time period? As long as we're talking post-western Rome and pre-firearms. What part of "Find the closest thing to what BM does" is unclear?
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Who cares what part of Europe? As long as it's somewhere in that general landmass. Who cares about what time period? As long as we're talking post-western Rome and pre-firearms. What part of "Find the closest thing to what BM does" is unclear?
Probably the fact that BM tends to be a grab bag of ideas from throughout the period.
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I'm just asking for what those basic stand on opposite sides of the battlefield and fight type of battles resemble. I know that such a strategy was not uncommon even in th ancient world, but not all cultures used such forms of warfare due to things such as resources, terrain, lifestyle, etc. Besides, those links provided by Vellos are many times more help than any "This is so hard to answer" comments. Yeah, I get that it's difficult because we're talking about the realism of a game. That naturally means unrealistic...I know. Now let's just get on with trying our best to look at what we have, because it might improve our understanding of the background.
(edited by mod to get back on topic)
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I'm just asking for what those basic stand on opposite sides of the battlefield and fight type of battles resemble. I know that such a strategy was not uncommon even in th ancient world, but not all cultures used such forms of warfare due to things such as resources, terrain, lifestyle, etc. Besides, those links provided by Vellos are many times more help than any "This is so hard to answer" comments. Yeah, I get that it's difficult because we're talking about the realism of a game. That naturally means unrealistic...I know. Now let's just get on with trying our best to look at what we have, because it might improve our understanding of the background.
I think people were just trying to point out that for the time period that BM is generally associated with, you are likely to find battle reports that both confirm that style of battle, and dispute it, depending on which conflict we are looking at.
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Touch wood I reach blighty Tuesday so will be able post the titles of those books soon after for anyone interested.
By the way the time line for the battles, formations, tactics etc they deal with stretches from the 8th to the mid 14th centuries.
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Now I've finally hit home base, and likewise "shouldn't" be required travel back to mainland Europe again for a week or more, I'm hoping to be able search out and post a few things folk might find most interesting, enlightening and informative from my favorite book of medieval warfare, and which if you read this part of the preface by it's author you'll perhaps understand why it is.
Page ix
General Preface
English-speaking historians probably have none to blame but themselves for, on the whole, not reading and digesting the lessons of De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen IXe tot begin XIVe eeuw, when it was first published in 1954. It was unfortunate that the languages of the Low Countries were not widely-enough known, for J.F. Verbruggen was to make a significant contribution to understanding medieval warfare. So it gives me great pleasure to present a newly translated, expanded and revised edition forty years on. In one sense, at least, his work is now out of date. This is clear from the sentences which begin it, in which Verbruggen bemoans the 'unfortunate treatment' which the medieval 'art of war' has received from historians. That this is no longer the case is in a large part due to his influence on a post-war generation of scholars interested in medieval warfare. I remember with what joy I fell upon the partial translation of his work in the late-1970s when commencing my postgraduate research. Previously, when studying for an MA in Medieval History I had been advised by R. Allen Brown at King's College, London, of the value of the work.
Even in the much-reduced translation, I was delighted to find an author who took military historians to task for completely distorting and underestimating the skill with which medieval societies and individual commanders organized war. Delbrück, Delpech and Oman fell alike to his scholarly sword, as he demonstrated the inaccuracy of their assessments which presented the 'Middle Ages' as a primitive period in which the 'Art of War' was lost, not to be regained until the Renaissance. He showed an understanding of strategy, tactics, individual and collective discipline and the management of warfare which stood in stark contrast to their theses. Where they stressed the selfish and disordered behaviour of 'the knights', he was able to point to careful planning of campaigns and battles which emphasized coherent manoeuvre and tactical plans. Flank attacks, ambushes, use of combined arms and rearguards—ignored by the most influential writer in English, Sir Charles Oman—all were discovered by Verbruggen in detailed studies of battles.
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Offtopic posts deleted.
I have one simple rule for the Background section: If you disagree with what someone says, find and post your own source.
If you don't want to look up sources, don't complain that the request is too hard. Just don't post anything.
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Self-interest and Profits of War (only a small part of the chapter)
Earlier in this chapter the poem of Bertrand de Born was quoted. It gives a remarkable insight into the true motives which prompted participation in wars. Bertrand wished that rich lords would hate each other, because a rich man is nobler, more generous, and benevolent in time of war than in peace. As soon as hostilities were announced, he said cynically : 'We can laugh, because the barons will love us, … but if they want us to stick to them, they will have to pay us well.'139 But it was not just high pay that made Bertrand anxious to fight. War offered other prospects as well that were far more alluring and entailed less danger. It was a good time for 'taking goods away from usurers', for robbing burghers and merchants on the highways. The riches were there for the taking. The poet belonged to the class of humble vavassors, whose possessions and fiefs were very small. War, and the plundering raids it involved, helped these impoverished knights make ends meet. When Bertrand offered his services to the count of Poitiers he was already wearing his helmet, and had his shield slung round his neck. But then the problem of equipping himself for a campaign, seeing that he had no money, arose. In another expedition, the campaign of Jean de Beaumont in Scotland in 1327 with the army of Edward III —for which more volunteers turned out than had been expected, since all of them were hoping for very high pay—Jean Le Bel, who was a member of the expedition, summed up what was necessary for a military campaign: 'Everybody started to buy according to his rank and status: tents, little horses used in the country, and they found enough of them at reasonable price, pots, kettles, and so on, necessary in a campaign. It cost a great deal of money for a knight to be able to go out completely equipped, especially considering his expensive horses. The financial problems of petty vassals are understandable too, but of course this does not excuse their actions as robber-knights.
NB These "robber-knights" are mentioned quite a few times in the book, either by that name or as "robber captains" and were held in such disdain by their "betters" they were forbidden have there men wear livery for many years.
(part of a chapter on commanders)
A well-informed chronicler, William of Poitiers, made an interesting comparison between the ways in which Caesar and William the Conqueror commanded their armies. 'In Caesar's case, it was sufficient for his fame and importance simply to issue orders while he was fighting the Britons and Gauls: only rarely did he take part in the fighting. This was the custom in ancient times, as is evident from the Commentaries. For William it would have been neither honourable nor effective merely to give orders in his conflict with the English, if he had not at the same time fulfilled his obligations as a knight, as he had always done in other wars. In every battle he fought with his sword, either as the first man or at least among the first.'158 That medieval concept was inspired by the customs and usages of chivalry, but it wasalso a natural consequence of the very small size of knightly armies. Because of this, the commander as a rule stayed very close to his knights. The hierarchy in such matters was not very strict: Tancred's biographer, Ralph of Caen, says that he looked upon his knights as his treasure, and often took over guard-duty from wounded or exhausted men in his retinue, while never letting his own turn go by.159 On the march the commander always had to be prepared to reach his destination with the last knights, and if the enemy laid an ambush, he had to fight with some of his troops. His example always inspired the other knights. In flight or in retreat he had to keep the enemy at bay with the rearguard, as Tancred and the young Louis the Fat did, with the best troops in the army.
Many of the best knights are taken prisoner.
Know full well that this is the custom:
The bravest fight in the rearguard
If there is a flight.
The others do not worry about this,
But try to save themselves
By fleeing headlong.160
Two English kings had tremendous influence as leaders: Richard I and Edward III. Edward I might
also be mentioned, but he won no victories on the continent. The Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal says of Richard I: 'The bravest were so fearless (under his command) that since that war thirty of our men have dared take on forty Frenchmen, a thing quite unheard of till then. It is plain from this that men who have a good leader are far more courageous and become a better fighting unit.'162
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All squires are equal, but some are more equal then others!!
In the thirteenth century squires had to have barded horses to qualify for higher pay: under Edward I in his Welsh wars (1277–1295) squires with armoured horses were paid 1 shilling a day, those with unprotected horses 6d or 8d. Philip IV of France applied the same rule in his wars between 1294– 1299: a squire with a good well armoured horse had a wage of 12s 6d tournois a day, others only 5s.26
And we thought BM's family feuds were bad.
A handful of detailed contemporary sources have brought the violent life of the knights in the eleventh century into sharp focus. Private wars, with vendettas and long feuds, were the order of the day, and families were divided into opposing camps engaged in cruel and savage strife, in which members of the knight's retinue, who were not bound to the families through blood ties, also played their part. There was also savage fighting within the families and retinues of the powerful lords, which often ended fatally. In the tough life of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries violence played so great a part that it could only be put down by the ruthless and uncompromising action of a powerful personality. Sometimes such a man as the saintly future bishop, Arnulf of Soissons, managed to secure peace or limit the bloodshed for a time. In the relatively densely populated county of Flanders there was often no room for all the sons of large noble families, and those who were less well-off were filled with envy of the more fortunate. Sometimes the struggle against an enemy clan drew family bonds closer. There was nothing specially unusual in the case of a well-known knight, Bonifacius, who was driven out of his own castle by his two brothers, who had murdered his young wife and baby son. Undaunted by fate, he killed one of the murderers and put the other to flight. The wild companions (feroces socii) of count Robert the Frisian of Flanders helped him to dethrone his nephew, but his ruthless behaviour led some nobles and rich men to plot to replace this cruel count with a gentlerprince, count Baldwin II of Hainault. Noble families in the Bruges district set about their private wars so ferociously that the blood money for murders committed amounted to 10,000 marks. Near Furnes the lady Evergerda ignored the conciliatory words of Bishop Arnulf and caused the drawbridge of her castle to be raised, for, on account of the murder of her husband and son, there was a bloody feud in the neighbourhood. A murder among the followers of Hugo of Blaringhem in1060 nearly caused a pitched battle between the members of the murderer's family and Hugo's retinue.
You know what they say, the bigger the ego, the bigger the retinue!!
The Carolingians had the scara, a corps of young and strong warriors, living at the court, who could be sent where they were needed. Young squires were trained for the profession of arms and were maintained at the court. There are many examples of young squires and knights who were given bed and board by their lord in his court or castle. These were the tirones, the milites de sua familia, de sua domo, the domestici milites, the commilitones, the knights of the mesnie or the hus. In 1108 Louis the Fat was thus able to raise a small army made up exclusively of knights belonging to his household. In the Third Crusade Richard I had a personal retinue, which formed one of the main units in the battle with his bodyguard. During the war in Wales Edward I's household consisted sometimes of more than a hundred bannerets and knights, and thirty or more sergeants-at-arms. During his campaign in Flanders in 1297 his household consisted first of 475 and later of 550 armoured cavalrymen. Some of these men were only temporarily incorporated into the royal retinue, which numbered at least 400–420 permanent members at that time, i.e. between August and 1 November 1297. The hostel of the king of France in 1317 included 235 armoured cavalrymen. The prince-bishop of Liége had a familia episcopalis which among other duties was charged with the defence of the castles. Sometimes he recruited a special retinue to deal with rebellious liegemen.
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Extract from a chapter on Tactical Units in Knightly Warfare.
In order to lessen the danger for the individual, to give him confidence in battle, to carry out an effective charge, but also to go into action in tactical units, the formations of knights were in closely serried ranks. It has already been shown how Ambroise and Guillaume Guiart, the one late in the twelfth century and the other early in the fourteenth, described the advance of the knightly units. Both chroniclers were eyewitnesses, and had a sound knowledge of methods of warfare of their time. Ambroise gave us several fine examples, and it is hard to resist the temptation to quote another good extract:
There were many units,
The most beautiful Christian warriors
That ever saw the people of the earth.
They were serried in ranks
As if they were people forged in iron
The battle line was wide and strong
And could well sustain fierce attacks;
And the rearguard was so full
Of good knights that it was difficult
To see their heads,
If one was not higher up;
It was not possible to throw a prune
Except on mailed and armoured men.
And in the Chanson d'Antioche we read:
And the other units of the Frankish family
March serried and in step.
The princes lead them on their lively chargers,
There is no space open where a glove can fall to earth.
Even the chansons de geste which are naturally inclined to relate the individual heroic deeds of the great lords, are here close to the accounts of eyewitnesses. The same image of the apple or glove thrown in the air is used over an over again:
Their units advance towards them in serried ranks;
If you throw a glove over their helmets
It would not land within a mile.
And:
The barons are so closely packed as they advance
That if you throw a glove on their helmets
It would not fall to ground within a mile.
Even between the formations of knights, advancing beside each other on the same front, there were sometimes only small spaces. When a formation is especially well drawn up, in order to make a surprise attack on the enemy, it advanced like the detachment of duke Girart de Fraite in the Chanson d' Aspremont:
They advanced secretly through a valley.
He had seventeen hundred men with him.
He led them in such close formation
That the wind could not blow between their lances.
Allowing for poetic exaggeration, the fact remains that the units were so closely packed that the horses were touching each other in formation. An excellent narrative source explains why the cavalrymen were formed up so closely.
In 1180 king Amalric wanted to relieve the fortress of Darum in the kingdom of Jerusalem, which was being besieged by Saladin. It describes how the king acted in order to break the enemy lines: 'Our army observed the enemy camp. Terrified because they were so powerful, our men began to draw closer together, as they had been trained to do, indeed so closely that they could scarcely carry out an attack because of the mass. The enemy fell upon them at once, and tried to force them apart … but our men… were too tightly packed. They fought off the enemy attack and continued their advance deliberately. By means of this dense formation, which made a charge very difficult, king Amalric broke through the besieging army and liberated the beleaguered fortress. Here it is explicitly stated that the very dense formation was used for fear of the enemy, and this shows that our analysis of the psychology of the knight is borne out by the statements of contemporaries. But at the same time the chronicler points out that in this case the formation was too dense, and made the charge more difficult: nevertheless, this density enabled the army to make stouter resistance to the attacks of the enemy, who tried vainly to break it up. The importance of such descriptions of battle-order can scarcely be over-emphasised. If an advance in very close order is the ideal to be aimed at, and is indeed achieved as far as possible, then it follows that duels and individual combats are out of the question. They became, in fact, increasingly difficult as the ranks were more tightly packed. These formations are a complete negation of the so called duels, of which a battle between two knightly armies was supposed to have consisted.
Closely drawn-up units are encountered in the tournaments as they were described in the Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal. They are also found in the battles at Acre and Arsuf during the Third Crusade, in the battles of Bouvines, Worringen and Mons-en-Pévéle, and in most of the narrative sources. It has been shown elsewhere that the chronicles are clear on this point.284 All the sources written in the vernacular and quoted above—Ambroise, the Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, Villehardouin, Robert de Clari, Joinville, Guiart, and many other chroniclers—mention conrois, banners, batailles and échelles. Knights in conrois, échelles or batailles fight on nearly every battlefield. The close similarity of the technical terms—bataille, battaglia, bataelge; eschiele, scara, scare, schiere; conrois and conroten—shows that they have a common origin and that they were widely spread over western Europe. The Germanic origin of the words indicates that tactical units had been used for a long time.
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Protection of the Flanks
Delbrück gives the impression in the passage just quoted that no units in the knightly armies were used to protect the flanks, or to attack the enemy on the flank. Closer investigation shows that this was not the case. In fact, medieval commanders went to great lengths to protect their flanks by various means, through careful selection of terrain, by expanding the front, by depth in formation, or by the use of special units charged with the task of covering the flanks. Delbrück was forced to concede, however, that precautionary measures were taken during the crusades. It was repeatedly stated that crusaders advanced in three columns, side by side, so as to be able to give battle in any direction. In the battle near the lake of Antioch the flanks of the knightly units were protected by the terrain, which made a broad front impossible. During the sortie from Antioch the crusaders tried to prevent a flanking movement along one side by spreading out their front, while the other flank was protected by the river Orontes. In this they were unsuccessful, but then they used a quickly formed unit to protect their flank and back and won the battle. At Bouvines, the French bishop Guérin warded off a threat from the flank by spreading out his front. The flanks of knightly armies could also be protected by a special formation. There are two quite remarkable examples of this —the battle of Ascalon in 1099 saw the crusaders advancing in nine units: three in the vanguard, three in the middle, and three in the rearguard. From whichever side the enemy appeared, three formations were always ready to hold them in check, while the centre units could always rush in where help was needed, and the back units covered the rear. The battle of Hab in 1119 gave an even more remarkable example. But in both instances units of foot-soldiers were also taking part in the battle, so these examples will be more closely examined in our exposition of general tactics. On the march from Acre to Arsuf the flanks of Richard I's army were well protected, so as to be ready to fight.
There is one further more important example from the late Middle Ages. Since Debück rightly pointed out that tactics remained practically unchanged up to the end of the fifteenth century, it seems permissible to give a very late but striking example. Jean de Bueil gives this advice in Le Jouvencel: 'If you are riding in enemy territory with one hundred, five hundred or one thousand men, whether in the hope of encountering him or of being challenged, without knowing what you expect to find, you must have men in front, behind and on the flanks to ensure that you are not surprised.' He proposes the following battle order: skirmishers were to go first, followed by a small body as vanguard. Then came the main body of the army, an efficient and powerful unit, flanked on each side by a wing, whose duty it was to attack the enemy flanks. A rearguard could come quickly to the help of the main army, and could if necessary be protected in the rear by detached knights, who could give the alarm if the enemy came from that direction. So there were quite substantial flanking units for the battle. In the column of march of the French royal army at Cassel in 1328, there were two wings, one with the fifth or royal detachment, the other with the eighth.
The deep formation which was used at Ascalon, Hab, Arsuf, Philippopoli, Worringen and in Jean de Bueil's advice, formed a stout protection against enemy attack on the flank. This was also true of the reserve, and it will be profitable to consider the use of this unit and the place of the unit commanders in battle.
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Sub-chapter from : II The Knights
NB Perhaps as interesting for it's detailing of the prices, supplies, paraphernalia etc, as for the insights into the tactical, strategic and evolution sides it offers.
The Marchfield and the Mayfield
In 692 Pepin II held the muster of the army in March, as was the custom in the kingdom of the Franks under Clovis. Charles Martel and his Austrasians attacked the army of Radbod and his Frisians in March 716, the army of Raganfred at Vinchy on 21 March 717. But in 755 or 756 Pepin III changed the date of the muster of the army from March to May, because in May there was enough grass for the horses to be fed. In 758, the tribute of the Saxons was changed from 500 cows to 300 horses. Pepin held the Field of May in 756, 758, 761, 763, 764 and 766. The army needed so much grass for the horses that a capitulary of 802–803 ordered two-thirds of the grass of some counties to be reserved. In 782 the army could start an expedition in the summer, because there was enough grass, but in April 798 there was not enough grass for the horses when the Saxons rebelled. There was still another reason to start the military operations later. It was better for the horsemen and their horses to invade the country of the enemy at the moment that the crop was ripe in the fields. Charlemagne held a Field of May at most seventeen times during his forty-five years of reign. In 775 and 781 the army went on campaign in July, in 777 in June or July. In 791 the big army on the frontier of Bavaria invaded the country of the Avars on 8 September. In 806 the general assembly was fixed on 17 June, in 807 in August. When the conquests ended and the yearly campaigns were no longer profitable, the poorer free men wished to stay at home. In 805 the emperor diminished the heribannum for the poorer free men. A capitulary of 806 shows a system of regulation: in Frisia a man who joined the army was helped by six men who stayed at home. In Saxony the number was five helpers for the man who participated in a campaign toward Spain or the land of the Avars, two helpers for one man who joined in an expedition towards Bohemia. In 807 the system shows that the poor warriors who had no land received five solidi from the five helpers. When Louis the Pious started his campaign against Brittany on 2 March 830, the free men rebelled and followed the sons of the emperor, Pepin and Lothar. During the struggle of Louis the Pious against his sons, and the war between the sons, in the years 840 to 842, the free men stayed at home and the fighting was done nearly exclusively by the leaders and their vassals, the horsemen. On 13 May 841 count Adalbert and the leaders of Lothar wanted to fight against the warriors of Louis the German in the Riessgau near the river Wornitz on the left side of the Danube. Before 'arriving at the point of the lances', the terrified vassals of Lothar turned back and fled, losing innumerable men in their flight. This was a combat of horsemen. The evolution was complete: armoured horsemen, vassals, were the principal element of the army, the foot-soldiers the secondary weapon. New and original tactics developed, for this European heavy cavalry used different methods from the Parthian tactics which were still being employed later by the Saracens and other Asiatic peoples. In western Europe the man who fought on horseback was known from the tenth century onwards as a knight. Thereafter, constant evolution took place: his equipment became increasingly heavy and impenetrable up to the end of the fifteenth century as armour was continually being further developed in a race with armour-piercing weapons. This heavy equipment made the cavalry supreme on the battlefield. It is important to consider the cost of equipping an armoured cavalryman in the middle of the eighth century, at the time when the Frankish heavy cavalry was being developed. The Ripuarian Law gives the price of weapons and equipment as well as the value of horses, oxen and cows.
The helmet 6 solidi
The brunia or byrny 12 solidi
The sword and scabbard 7 solidi
The sword alone, without scabbard 3 solidi
The leggings 6 solidi
The lance and shield 2 solidi
The horse 12 solidi
A sound ox with horns was then worth two solidi, a sound cow with horns anything between one and three solidi, a sound mare three solidi. The equipment of an armoured cavalryman thus cost as much as fifteen mares or nearly twenty-three oxen, an enormous sum of money. It is not surprising that in 761 a small landowner, Isanhard, sold his inheritance for a horse and a sword. Complete equipment could only be expected of the very rich. The Capitulary of Thionville in 805 required a brunia or cuirass only of those who possessed or held as beneficium twelve mansi, about 300–450 acres: there cannot have been many who were so rich. The emperor of course could provide cuirasses for his men, and bishops, abbots, abbesses and counts were obliged to have certain number to equip their men. A reserve of equipment for poorer vassals was formed from the payments of the fine of the heriban by those who did not fulfil their military obligations. Charlemagne certainly had a stronger army than his adversaries, but he owed his successes primarily to a relatively small number of armoured cavalrymen, whose superiority was largely due to their heavy armament. This small number of well armed men was aided by a considerable number of light cavalrymen, possessing no brunia, who formed the mass of the mounted army. The Frankish historiographers often stressed their more efficient equipment. Sometimes indeed, it was too heavy, as in 778, when Charlemagne's army was surprised in a Pyrenean mountain pass by the lightly armed Basques, and suffered the famous defeat which was later described in the Chanson de Roland. The armoured cavalrymen were mostly vassals who could be made knights. Up to the middle of the thirteenth century these knights were the most prominent and usually the most numerous section of the armoured cavalry. They were occasionally reinforced with well-equipped non-vassal cavalrymen serving as mercenaries. A prince's retinue also included warriors who received a mail-shirt from him, but were in no way vassals. Armoured cavalrymen who were not knights are mentioned five times in the army of the count of Hainault, and on four occasions they were equal in numbers to the knights.
In 1172: 340 knights and 340 armoured cavalry
In 1180: 100 knights and 100 armoured cavalry
In 1181: first 100 knights and as many cavalry, then eighty of each
In 1187 there were 110 knights and only eighty armoured cavalry, obviously small numbers. The count of Flanders had on one occasion 500 knights and 1,000 armoured horsemen in his army, at a time when many knights stayed in their own castles;21 no examples of this occur elsewhere. It is noteworthy that the princes were able to recruit and equip such armoured men. From the early ninth century to the end of the eleventh there were many vassals who at first had no brunia, and later no hauberk, but the social rise of vassals reduced the number of these light cavalrymen. When William the Conqueror introduced feudal organization into England, a knightly fief was a fief for which a vassal with a hauberk had to serve. In 1181 the first clause of the Assize of Arms of Henry II stipulated that every baron who had knights' fees on his demesne should provide hauberks, helmets, shields and lances for them. Horses were also armoured with chain mail after the middle of this century, and about that time a better saddle was introduced, in which the higher pommel and cantle gave more support before and behind. In 1187 the count of Hainault aided King Philip Augustus with a unit of 190 horsemen, of whom more than 109 had barded, or armoured horses.24 In the thirteenth century squires had to have barded horses to qualify for higher pay: under Edward I in his Welsh wars (1277–1295) squires with armoured horses were paid 1 shilling a day, those with unprotected horses 6d or 8d. Philip IV of France applied the same rule in his wars between 1294–1299: a squire with a good well armoured horse had a wage of 12s 6d tournois a day, others only 5s. The use of armoured horses naturally strengthened the cavalry units; the best horses and strongest knights were used in the front rank. From the middle of the thirteenth century onwards the number of squires (i.e. sons of knights who had not yet been knighted) grew continuously, until by the end of that century they were more numerous than the knights. In time of peace they chose to remain squires because the accolade was accompanied by great and expensive festivities. They hoped to be dubbed knights before a battle, as at Mons-en-Pévéle in 1304 and Worringen in 1288. Collectively, the knights and squires were known as armures de fer, because they wore mail shirts. This armour was always very expensive, and it was becoming stouter and heavier all the time. The brunia, a leather tunic with iron rings or plates, gave way to the hauberk, a mail-shirt, which in turn was replaced in the last third of the twelfth century by the great hauberk, or long mail-shirt. From the middle of the thirteenth century this was reinforced with metal plates. This technical evolution exerted an important influence on the social position of the knight—the completely-equipped horseman par excellence—who became increasingly prominent. The number of knights was greatest in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries. At the end of the twelfth, and specially in the thirteenth century, they dwindled rapidly, but those who remained were both more important and far richer than their counterparts of the eleventh century. As time went on, horses were increasingly used. As early as 1101 every one of the 1,000 knights who were promised by Count Robert II of Flanders to the king of England had three horses. A knight's horses were a great expense. In order to enable the ruler to replace the horses which knights lost during a campaign, the animals had a value placed upon them. The horses of Geraard de Moor, lord of Wessegem, were worth the following sums in 1297, in livres tournois:
(1) The best horse, called Mouton £300
(2) The black horse that he got from Louis, son of Robert of Bethune £250)
(3) The horse that he got from the king of France £125
(4) A horse he had from the count of Flanders £225
(5) Another from William of Dendermonde £120
(6) The horse from John of Namur £140
(7) A horse for the march (courser) £ 40 Total £1200
(NB Much abridged from here)
In England and France the rich barons and bannerets rode still more expensive war-horses. Evidently it was not easy for the knights to buy and maintain such expensive war-horses. In addition, they had to be fully equipped themselves, with a mail-shirt reinforced with chest, shoulder and elbow plates, helmet, sword, lance, silken pennon, tent, all sorts of kitchen utensils such as kettles, pots, and pans and of course a beast of burden to carry all this. By the thirteenth century this had become so expensive that the number of knights who could afford it had dwindled considerably. By the end of that century and in the early fourteenth real knights were less numerous: in the above-mentioned retinue of Geraard there were only three knights: his brother Philip, Pieter of Uitkerke and Riquart Standaerd. In 1302 Zeger of Ghent and his son had twenty-two squires with them. For nine knights from Zeeland in the same year we find 111 squires. The active strengths of an army of armoured cavalry was limited by the considerable cost of buying expensive arms and equipment. The knights formed a social class living on the work of subordinates who cultivated the land for them, or who helped to assure the welfare of their master in various ways, and the vassals who lived at the court of a prince and were completely supported there cannot have been very numerous. In time knighthood became a hereditary class which had all sorts of privileges and this exclusive class had to recruit its members from its own ranks, which again led to small armies. The armoured fighter had also to be trained as a horseman, and good cavalrymen cannot be turned out quickly.
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I've decided put my other book aside for a while and have a closer study of this one instead, (which won't be difficult as only glanced at it so far :D) as after flicking through the first 80 or so pages of the other I think the remaining 400+ can wait!!
So is there anything particular from here might be useful to post?
Contents
Preface ix
PART I Generals and leaders, A–Z 1
PART II Military events This part includes in each section a narrative account of
the main political and military events; a list of generals and leaders who relate to the
section, details of whom may be found in the A–Z in Part I; an A–Z of battles and
sieges for each section.
108
1 Romans and barbarians, 400–750 110
2 Charlemagne and the Carolingians, 750–850 120
3 The Vikings, Scandinavia and northern Europe, 850–1050 127
4 The Anglo-Saxon invasions and England, 450–1066 138
5 The Norman Conquests in Britain and Europe, 911–1154 151
6 The Holy Roman Empire and central Europe, 850–1500 165
7 The Byzantine Empire and eastern Europe, 400–1453 177
8 The Crusades, 1095–1500 189
9 The Capetians and the Valois, France 987–1500 201
10 The Angevins to the Tudors, Britain 1154–1485 217
11 Iberia and the Reconquista, 850–1492 229
12 Renaissance Italy, 1250–1525 237
zvv iii
PART III Military topics This part includes a general account of the significance
of each topic and an A–Z of relevant terms for each section. Where appropriate a list
of relevant names that appear in Part I is provided. Also where appropriate a list of
events that appear in Part II is provided; the number in brackets notes the relevant
section.
245
13 Arms of the warrior 247
14 Medieval armour 260
15 Heraldry 272
16 Medieval armies 281
17 Castles and siege warfare 294
18 Medieval naval warfare 320
19 The medieval military orders 326
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sieges and military orders.
maybe you could create new threads for each of them...
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Sadly even this book falls into the same camp as most others in being very poor in going into detail concerning sieges, as apart from a list and sketchy descriptions of major castle of the period, and a A-Z of equipment used etc, it's almost bereft of anything, and one of the reasons I'm frantically searching for a certain book that's supposed really do the subject justice.
Which kind of orders are you thinking of?, the Military orders such as the Templers etc, or actual orders par-say, as while this book contains only fairly basic information concerning both, my other book goes into the latter in extreme detail.
ie these are just a few of the chapters where things like that are dicussed in.
Discipline in camp and on the march 77
Battle discipline 83
Orders by trumpets and banners 84
Commands and evolutions: a comparison with Byzantium 85
The tactical significance of the standard 89
The re-grouping of units and the manoeuvre of feigned flight 91
The importance of order within the formation 97
Tactical aims 103
hehe I can't really post the full index for that one, as kind of long shall we say :)
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Orders like the Templars. They would good source material for a guild.