I've come across a sub-chapter in a book I think might be of use concerning how pikes became the infantry's primary mainstay against cavalry at this time. (Apologies in advance for it's length
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Taken from “The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages” by J F Verbruggen
Tactics of the Foot-soldiers
1. Formations and Positions of the Foot-soldiers on the Battlefields
Although the Flemings, Scots and Swiss were more or less similarly armed, their tactics were not the same. The Flemings liked to fight on a broad front, in the manner of the phalanx of antiquity. The Scots used circular formations or schiltrons, while the Swiss were famous for their deep formations.
Before the battle began, the front of the battle-order was protected from a short distance away by crossbowmen or ordinary archers. These men had to cover the deployment of the main battle order and then start the fighting by skirmishing. They established contact with the enemy and no decisive action was expected of them, since the part they played had normally no effect on the course of the battle. The archers could also be used to protect the flanks of the battle order, in which case the protection was merely temporary, since they could be driven off by the enemy.
For this reason the foot-soldiers usually sought to cover their flanks by natural obstacles, such as ditches, rivers, hills, woods, and so on. If a defensive battle was being fought, the foot also tried to protect its front: at Courtrai the front and flanks of the Flemings were protected by ditches. At Mons-en-Pévèle one wing was supported by the village hedge, and the other was up against a brook. At Falkirk the Scots had a marsh in front of their battle order, and archers on the wings were stationed to cover the flanks. At Bannockburn their front was protected by artificial pits, and the main battle order was drawn up in a wood. The Swiss also made good use of the terrain as a protection for their flanks
in battle.
The formations of the foot-soldiers became increasingly closely packed, so that enemy knights could not penetrate them. If the terrain and the army's size permitted, a reserve corps was placed behind the front. Whereas in general knights could not break through the solid units of the footsoldiers, it was occasionally thought unnecessary to keep the troops in reserve behind the strong main force. Thus the Flemings had no unit in reserve at Mons-en-Pévèle, but their rear was protected by the army waggons, and foot-soldiers were posted on top of these.
Among the Flemings, Scots and Swiss the battle order consisted of two, three, or more large units which could operate independently if necessary, but in a defensive action they could merge into a single tightly closed formation. Among the Flemings each of these units had its own large banner, usually that of an important city. The whole army was drawn up under the standard of the principality. The little formations of the guilds each had their own banner, which served as a rallying point on the march and in battle. This banner could of course be used to convey orders, and to maintain direction both in attack and retreat. The Flemish foot-soldiers also used trumpets, the Scots horns and other instruments, and the Swiss used drums, whose beat helped the marching men. Certain orders, such as assembly, march, and so on, could be sounded with these instruments.
Among the Swiss each village and city had its banner or standard, but these were usually collected together in the middle of one large formation, thus they were no use to indicate direction. By virtue of the fact that the Swiss usually operated on narrow fronts however it was easier to maintain direction during the advance than it was in units which, like those of the Flemings, marched on a broad front.
Later in the fourteenth century the Swiss used a rectangular formation in which there was an equal number of men abreast in each rank, packed shoulder to shoulder, and at a greater distance apart in depth. The Germanic peoples had used this type of narrow and deep column, and it is possible that the Swiss had retained it from the early Middle Ages.
For fighting in the narrow Alpine valleys such formations were particularly useful, in that they moved on so narrow a front. They were also better able to withstand the charges of the mailed cavalry against the flanks. In such a case the footsoldiers always had to halt and make a front in the direction of the threat, but the Swiss could offer resistance along a broad front since their flank, turned to make this front, had great width.
Later the Swiss usually fought in three large units, each supporting the other, the second and third not marching level with the first, but following at a certain distance. The first unit, for example, would form the left wing, the second unit rather further back would be the centre, and the third even further back was the right wing. Thus it was possible for the second formation to protect a flank of the first, while its own flank was covered by the third. Sometimes the leading formation, serving as the centre, pushed forward, while the second and third advanced to the left and right of it. In that case both flanks of the first unit were protected by the second and third.
It was enough for the Swiss to choose the battlefield so that one of their flanks was naturally protected, the other could then be protected by the units marching further behind. The third formation in the meantime kept its freedom of operation, and if need arose, could outflank the enemy and attack him both in the flank and rear.
If the knights charged two units in the flank, the third formation could carry out its own attack and break through the front of the enemy knights. Once this was accomplished, the victorious unit rescued the two formations which had been checked, and defeated the enemy. It was understandably very difficult for the knights to attack one of these Swiss units in the flank, since they always had to remember the other units coming up behind.
The more powerful the units of the foot-soldiers were, the greater their chance of beating a mounted enemy army. However in order to keep the requisite flexibility it was necessary to split the army into three or four units. If one of these units was threatened by the enemy on all sides, they assumed a circular formation, like a crown, in order to be able to resist the charges of the armoured cavalry from all directions. The Swiss used these crown-formations for defence, as for example the men of Bern in 1271, who were drawn up in closely serried ranks, with grounded pikes. The Habsburg knights hesitated, for the foot-soldiers seemed very stubborn and resolute. No one thought it wise to charge. Then one brave knight boldly made up his mind to attack. He was caught by the Swiss pikes and killed.
In 1289 the army of a son of king Rudolf of Habsburg surprised the men of Bern on the Schlosshalde. Count Louis of Homberg-Rapperswyl managed to penetrate into the formation, which was defeated. The same thing was done in 1332 by the Austrian knight Stülinger of
Regensburg in a battle against the men of Bern and Solothurn. He penetrated the formation of the foot-soldiers and was killed, but had done enough to bring victory for his comrades.
We have already seen that the Scots used these crown-formations regularly. Between 1302 and 1304, and during the battle of Cassel in 1328, the Flemings also often formed a crown, even during the actual battle, so as to be able to fight off attacks from any direction. Small corps of Flemish footsoldiers were annihilated in such battles, or heavily defeated, as happened for example to two units at Arques in 1303. This was partly due to the fact that owing to their small numbers they did not have their normal confidence in a successful defence, for the proportionate strengths were greatly in the enemy's favour.
There was an interesting battle in 1325 in which 800 rebels of the Franc of Bruges fought against the men of Ghent, who were on the side of count Louis of Nevers. The men of Ghent were led by the knights Zeger of Courtrai and Hector Vilain, who also commanded a small unit of heavy cavalry. The rebels drew themselves up in crown formation, with the bravest and best equipped men in the outer ranks, and the rest of the soldiers behind them. The leaders of the men of Ghent first rode round the crown with their cavalry, seeking a weak spot, and making a few attacks for this purpose, but they were beaten off. Then Hector Vilain made a great charge with forty picked cavalrymen, specially devoted to him. He rushed at the rebels with loud war-cries, while his own foot-soldiers apparently attacked as well. His charge carried him right through the formation, and the little body of rebels was destroyed.
When the surprise attack on the French camp at Cassel in 1328 was unsuccessful, Zannekin drew up his largest unit in the shape of a crown, which was violently attacked by the French king and his knights, both sides suffering heavy losses. The Flemings were completely surrounded and defended themselves with the courage of despair. Many French nobles lost their horses in the tremendous charges. The Flemish formation stood firm however, and drove off the attacks, and the French barons saw that they could not destroy this unit by force. They retreated, leaving the road to Cassel open to the Flemings, and the latter were captured by a trick.
Perhaps they thought that the French armoured cavalry were being obliged to retreat, or perhaps they hoped to retreat in good order with their whole unit, but it was a desperate flight, during which the French cavalry pursued them relentlessly. In this battle the peasants from the Westhoek abandoned the traditional Flemish tactics, and marched resolutely to attack the enemy instead of waiting in motionless defence. They chose the courageous solution to the great problem of the foot-soldiers of that time—to offer a defensive or to give an offensive battle.
2. Defence or Attack in Battle?
We have already seen that the foot-soldiers usually operated defensively. This was absolutely necessary as long as they were inexperienced, and could not produce flexible formations which would remain in good order during an attack. Even as late as the fifteenth century the outstanding authority on tactics of the day, Jean de Bueil, prescribed defensive tactics for the foot-soldiers. This French nobleman was the real victor over the Swiss in 1444 at the battle of St Jacob-en-Birs. He was convinced that the Swiss defeat was due to their taking the offensive in the battle.
Up to the beginning of the fourteenth century it was rare for the foot-soldiers to dare to attack enemy knightly formations. Great battles like Falkirk, Courtrai, Mons-en-Pévèle and Bannockburn were started with foot-soldiers playing a motionless defensive role.
But it was possible to exploit the exhaustion of the knights after the failure of their charges. As soon as the armoured cavalry were worn out by the stubborn defence of the foot-soldiers, the latter went over to the offensive with a strong counter-attack. Those cautious tactics brought the Flemings victory at Courtrai, and might have helped them to win at Mons-en-Pévèle, where their counter-attack was almost successful.
During the second day of the battle of Bannockburn the Scots forced the English to attack at once, when they were not yet ready for battle. It is possible that the Scots then attacked in their turn, but this is not quite certain. In any case, Robert Bruce systematically avoided major battles after his victory, and had evidently not come to the conclusion that his foot-soldiers could attack and defeat mailed cavalry in the open field.
He made surprise attacks in favourable circumstances, and in these he was always successful. In 1327, the Scots acted defensively, and chose such favourable positions that the English knights could not attack them. At Dupplin Moor in 1332, and the following year at Halidon Hill, the Scots took the offensive, and in both cases they were heavily defeated. They also had to reckon with excellent English defensive tactics.
After the victory at Courtrai in 1302 there was a growing demand among the Flemish communal armies to abandon the defensive in battle and go over to the attack. Although William of Jülich was a strong advocate of attack in the open field, the more cautious commanders succeeded in having his plans rejected.
The powerful counter-attack on the battlefield at Mons-en-Pévèle, and offensive operations in small groups during the battle, like the successful sortie of the men of Ypres against the French missiles, encouraged the communal armies to adopt new methods. They wanted in future to attack by night, by the light of the full moon. If this was not possible, they thought of attacking by day immediately the battle was joined, in order to make the French knights fight hand-to-hand at once, for in such close fighting larger armies enjoyed great advantages, as we shall soon see from our account of the battle of Courtrai, and from the general picture of battles of foot-soldiers.
Against a very powerful royal army, and in far less favourable circumstances, the peasants from the Westhoek came to attack at Cassel in 1328. They hoped to surprise the enemy at nightfall, but the raid failed and ended in frightful disaster for the Flemish insurgents. When the men of Ghent and their allies attacked another mighty royal army just as bravely at Westrozebeke in 1382, they in their turn were crushingly defeated.
The offensive tactics of the Flemings miscarried just as miserably as those of the Scots. In both cases the foot-soldiers were attacked by heavy cavalry on the flank and in the rear, and could not break out of the encirclement. The Flemish formations were unwieldy, and not flexible enough. They seemed capable of transforming their phalanx quickly into a crown formation, but this was a defensive position and made further attack impossible. In the beginning of the fourteenth century the Flemings lacked the indispensable experience to give offensive battle successfully.
The Swiss had considerable luck in the development of their foot-soldiers. They not only acquired the necessary experience, but their armies grew stronger as well, owing to the expansion of their confederation. Their formations were also better adapted to attack than the broad formations of the Flemings, who were forced to fight on their open plains against the armies of the French knights. The Swiss military system was to attain a very high standard by the end of the Middle Ages, and to revolutionize the art of war, but in the period just covered, their tactics were in an early stage of development and were as yet no better than the Flemish and Scottish tactics.
