Just as the republicans are doing. Except that since they have the power to actually block the project, then it's all really a cunning plan of compromise by well-intended do-gooders who want to save people from their misguided selves? I have a hard time believing that.
It's not a secret or cunning compromise. Yes, it's sub-optimal.
Has nobody here ever looked at a prisoner's dilemma? My argument runs that, because neither side has a credible commitment mechanism from the other that they will "collude" in electoral mutually assured destruction, the only way for altruistic representatives to accomplish any goal is mutual harassment, brinksmanship, and apocalyptic measures. Even if a committee works out an agreement, there are enough radicals in both parties (especially in the Republicans; but if Occupy politicizes in any organized fashion, I expect the Democrats to do a similar thing in/after 2012) in the US to torpedo it. And if just a few representatives refuse to compromise, it creates a major political hazard for ALL representatives.
In sum, because no credible commitment mechanisms exist, mutual hostility resulting in policy-making by repeated crises is a second-best solution. Compromise is best for the nation, but if any politically meaningful element in either party refuses to compromise, it destroys the entire agenda, and, in the next election destroys the compromisers, creating a MORE radical group.
I would argue that the pre-Tea Party Republican Party was comparatively compromise-oriented. Yes, they were belligerent on some issues, but they compromised on many issues (like the debt ceiling) that are now issues of major debate. But, in 2010, moderates and compromisers were punished in Republican (and Blue-Dog) areas. This sent a signal to representatives that compromise will create intractable radicals. So the next best solution is to appear an intractable radical, and create crises that allow for some kind of policy formation, even a sub-optimal one.
Yes, compromise is more optimal, in a world where the electorate does not respond to the decisions of representatives. But in a world where the electorate does respond, and tends to respond by demanding increasing radicalism, compromise is not a long-run optimal solution. Until meaningful credit downgrades hit and borrowing costs rise significantly. At that point, the fallout of compromise is less than the fallout of second-best or sub-optimal policy formation.