I just briefly flipped through past Magistrate rulings.
As best I can tell, the Magistrates have not ruled on strategic secessions yet.
I would caution either side against saying the rule IS about either outcomes or intents. Say it has been interpreted that way, fine. But the rule IS about whatever the Magistrates say it is about, unless Tom decides to intervene.
Most of the arguments up to this point do not seem very germaine. The core debate here is how to interpret the text of the rule. Specifically, we should be arguing about the phrase "in order to circumvent." Does that imply "With the psychological intent and expectation of circumventing?" or "With the effect of circumventing?"
Once that debate is resolved, we can argue about efficacy: can we police intent? How far removed must the effect be, or how incidental? But until we settle, based on the text itself, the intent/outcomes question, the rest is moot.
Also, while Tom is free to intervene, unless and until Tom does intervene, we cannot base any rulings on how frequently or not he has chosen to respond to accusations. We haven't usually gotten detailed explanations and justifications of those decisions, so we really can't reason from them. And, to reiterate, the Magistrates are not inheritors of a pre-existing set of rules. Tom's previous decisions and Titan decisions were not always consistent, not widely understood, not regularly recorded, and do not constitute a basis of principles or rules to which we can reliably appeal. The only exceptions are in stated rules like the IRs and Social Contract, and if Tom decides to speak on this case specifically.
So, someone convince me that "in order to circumvent" means something other than intent.
