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In the thirteenth century English barons had the right to let their knights and squires wear a badge or uniform. It was considered a scandalous thing when a robber captain gave his men a uniform, just as if he were a baron! In the fourteenth century a man had to be a banneret at least for his knights and squires to deck themselves out in such a fashion. In the Scalacronica, Sir Thomas Gray of Heton wrote that the followers of the English barons who rose against Edward II wore identical clothes. At Bouvines the emperor Otto was recognised by the device of his conroi.
The strength of these units varied according to the power of the liege lord, but at Worringen several small banners were grouped together. The second half of the twelfth century sees the appearance of the bannerets, commanders of a unit of twenty knights. In the Welsh wars of Edward I some bannerets have 20 knights and squires, but others have less warriors in their unit. Since Guiart described these conrois as square units, it may be assumed that formations with 12 to 24 cavalrymen placed 6 or 8 of them in the front rank, the others lined up in a second or third rank. The great bataille was formed of a series of conrois drawn up next to each other. This gave rectangular formations two or three men deep, with a front of fifty, sixty or more knights and squires.
The best example of the complete deployment of an army in 'battles' and banners was that of the royal French army which advanced to Cassel in 1328 to crush the rebels from coastal Flanders. It was made up of ten 'battles' with 177 banners when it reached its destination, and with some reinforcements finally totalled 196 banners.
It is useful to trace what later happened to these small units: in 1351 king John the Good of France wanted to draw up his troops effectively, and gave the order to form larger units, routes of at least twenty-five cavalry, better still thirty to eighty. It is perfectly possible and logical that as far as the strength of small units was concerned, there was a return to the conditions that had prevailed in the twelfth century, when these formations apparently had more horsemen than in the early fourteenth century. This would certainly be in accordance with the decrease in the number of knights. According to the Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, the chamberlain of Tancarville actually had forty knights or more in his banner, while William the Marshal himself had fifty and more in his conestablie when he was in the service of Henry II.
One of the best indications that such small formations made up tactical units comes from the East, in the kingdom founded by Baldwin IX. His brother and successor, Henry of Constantinople, divided his army into fifteen 'battles', each of which consisted of twenty knights and armoured cavalry, except the fifteenth, made up of fifty men and commanded by the emperor himself. There were also three similar units made up of Greeks in this army. The units are notably small for the times, simply because the army was very small altogether.
This little army made its attack in four lines staggered in depth, in units of forty men each, that is, two small units joined. 'And Pieres de Braiscuel and Nicholes de Mailli were put in the vanguard with Joffroi the marshal, and they said that they would charge in front, between him and Milon le Brabant, and then Guillaumes dou Parcoi and Lyenars de Helemes; and the emperor covered the chargers'
In 1211, there was another example of this sort in the battle by the river Espiga. Henry I had again formed fifteen units, each consisting of fifteen knights, except that of the emperor, which had fifty. Henry ordered twelve units to begin the attack, lest the balance of numbers turned out too much to the disadvantage of his troops. A detachment remained in camp to guard the tents. The emperor was victorious, and pursued the enemy from midday till sunset. He said that he lost no men.
Here we are clearly dealing with tactical units. What would be the point of carrying out their charges in the manner described if there were no tactical units executing the commands of the leader as one man? Why else were the formations so small, instead of forming a large detachment, and keeping another as a reserve as soon as the propitious moment comes. At the same time it must be pointed out how Henry was motivated in the second instance: this time the ratio of numbers was so much to his disadvantage that he only dared put a small part of his army in the second and possibly the third line.
NB Next “The Tactical Significance of the Standard”
